The Community Development Block Grant Program : a local perspective. by Shankle, Dean E.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1992
The Community Development Block Grant
Program : a local perspective.
Dean E. Shankle
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shankle, Dean E., "The Community Development Block Grant Program : a local perspective." (1992). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 -
February 2014. 1842.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1842

THE =~!TY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMA LOCAL PERSPECTIVE
Dissertation Presented
by
DEAN E. SHANKLE, JR.
Submitted to the Graduate School of theUniversity of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 1992
Political Science
©Copyright by Dean E
_ s[]anki^ ^ ^
All Rights Reserved
THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM
A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE
A Dissertation Presented
by
DEAN E. SHANKLE, JR.
Approved as to style and content by:
rer^rey L. Sedgwick, Chair
Fred A. Kramer, Member
George T. Sulzner, Department Head
Political Science Department
JEAN, MY WIFE, WITH LOVE
ABSTRACT
THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM-
A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE
MAY 19 92
DEAN E. SHANKLE, JR., B.A., KEENE STATE COLLEGE
M.P.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
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In 1974, seven previously separate categorical grants
were combined in the newly authorized Community Development
Block Grant Program and placed under the administration of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. One
component of this program became known as the Small Cities
Program. It involved discretionary, non-entitlement funds
that are awarded on a competitive basis to municipalities of
fewer than 50,000 people.
The 1981 reauthorization included a provision allowing
the states to administer the Small Cities Program.
Beginning with the 1983 funding cycle, the New Hampshire
Office of State Planning undertook this responsibility. The
question that this dissertation set out to answer was
whether this devolution has, as envisioned by its advocates,
allowed for a more flexible, efficient and wide-spread
disbursement of these funds. The focus has been on the
effects on the program as administered at the local level.
The evaluation was done in four steps:
1. Data on each grant application and award in New
Hampshire from 1975 to 1990 was gathered and analyzed.
2. Changes in the program's major design features under
both HUD and OSP were summarized.
3. People who had participated in the program under both
administrations were interviewed.
4. Conclusions were reached based on an analysis of all
available data.
It was found that after the devolution:
1. A greater number and percentage of applications were
funded
.
2. The average size of municipalities receiving funds
decreased significantly.
3. The types of activities funded changed, with a greater
proportion of the money going toward economic development
and public facilities projects rather than housing
rehabilitation
.
These findings, and the other data obtained, led to the
following conclusions:
1. The devolution accomplished its major goal.
2
.
Human resource capacity-building on the state and local
level is vital.
3. New Hampshire's program design succeeded because it was
flexible, utilized a straight-forward scoring system and had
clear objectives.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ultimately, the question has to be asked: Who is
^•p PrT°T?r?m f° r ?nd What is Lt opposed to do for
t^l ^ the r° leS for the States? Locali-ies. The poor? Comprehensive neighborhood revi-taiization? Sewer and water lines? Entrepreneursseeking subsidies from government? And job cre-ation? Much of the struggle over the program isdue to confusion over these issues. It may bemore important to look not only at Congressionalintent or executive implementation, but at who
ultimately benefits from the program and how thosebenefits manifest themselves. States benefit fromthe staffing, visibility, and power that goes
naturally with resource allocation. Certain lo-
calities benefit based on the project selection
criteria and how much of the funding they can uselocally to serve the interests of elected and
appointed officials. Whether the poor reallybenefit from the program is, to us, the crucial
question, and it remains largely unanswered at
this time. (Jennings, et al, 1986, p. 248)
This is the final paragraph of From Nation to States:
The Small Cities Commu nity Development Block Grant Program
,
the most comprehensive analysis to date of the devolution of
the CDBG program. It was clearly the editors' desire to set
out a challenge to others to pick up where they left off.
This essay will attempt to do that. As the title of their
book suggests, they were concentrating on one component of
the CDBG Program, the Small Cities portion. Basically, the
Small Cities funding is allocated by an open competition in
which interested local governmental units attempt to "win"
funds by writing successful grant applications. The other
major component of the CDBG program is the Entitlement
portion, whereby all communities of a given size receive
funds based on a complicated allocation formula. My essay
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will also focus exclusively on the Small cities Program
because the states have no say over the disbursement of
entitlement funds.
These components were developed with two different
purposes in mind. Entitlement cities can do long-term
planning. Their leadership is aware that every year a
certain designated amount of money will be available for
housing rehabilitation, public facility improvements and
economic development activities. They can target a certain
section for multi-year funding or decide to do housing
rehabilitation projects in different neighborhoods on a
rotating basis. The certainty of the funding greatly in-
creases their flexibility.
The Small Cities funding is different. The project-
specific nature of these grants necessarily results in
projects that are not merely one piece in an overall commu-
nity development strategy. The competitive nature of these
awards forces both the states and communities to look
closely at the needs of the people and design projects which
meet those needs. The focus becomes much more "people-
oriented"; community development is not as important. Since
Small Cities projects are rarely funded for more than one
year, long-term planning is not paramount; short-term
results are. The Small Cities component is especially
important in a state like New Hampshire where it is not
unusual to find rural pockets of poverty in otherwise
affluent bedroom communities.
The goal of the devolution from the nation to the
states was, as we shall see, to improve the program's abili-
ty to achieve this purpose — to allow CDBG funds to be
used to meet more effectively the needs of people in the
program areas it covers. My thesis is that by providing for
a wider disbursement of the funds, by fostering a more
efficient administration of the program, and by encouraging
a more careful selection of projects for funding, devolution
has accomplished that goal in New Hampshire. This essay
will develop these themes.
A. Purpose
When undertaking a study of this nature and magnitude,
it would seem reasonable to outline the reasons why this
should be done. There are two distinctly different reasons
I have chosen this subject: the first, strictly academic;
the second, more personal.
In his classic work, Understanding Public Policy .
Thomas Dye stated that Americans "assume that when Congress
adopts a policy... the effects of the policy will be felt by
society and will be those intended by the policy." In his
next sentence he concludes the obvious: "Unfortunately,
these assumptions are not always warranted." (Dye, 1975, p.
327) Considering the amount of resources being allocated to
this program, it would seem worthwhile to test this
assumption on this program. This paper will be an attempt
to determine whether the devolution of the CDBG from the
federal government to the states achieved its stated goals.
The approach this paper will take, therefore, will be that
of a classic public policy evaluation. 1
James E. Anderson, in Cases in Public Pol i
c
Y-M„ki nq
,
explains that, in general, policy evaluation is the "as-
sessment of policy... to determine whether it is accomplish-
ing its goals..." (Anderson, 1982, p. 209) To do an
effective evaluation, says Anderson, the researcher must
undertake a "systematic examination and explanation of the
formation... (of the program), its substantive content, and
its impact and consequences." (Anderson, 1982, vii.)
He further details various approaches that can be taken
when doing an evaluation. First, an analysis can be done
which will determine whether a particular policy is
feasible. He suggests that agencies regularly do this sort
of analysis both before policy adoption and during its
implementation
.
Next, he describes a type of policy evaluation which
concentrates
"on the administration or operation of particular
policies and programs... Evaluations conducted
along these lines can help tell us whether
programs are honestly or efficiently operated and
who receives their immediate benefits. They will
tell us relatively little, however, concerning the
societal effects of a program or policy, whether
it's achieving its purposes, or whether it has
other consequences." (Anderson, 1982, p. 210)
The literature on public policy analysis generally
recognizes five steps in the process: Agenda setting,
formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation
(which is sometimes split into evaluation of outputs
and the evaluation of outcomes).
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I have chosen not to use either of these methods. My
concern, as I stated earlier, is to see if the devolution
has allowed the funds to be more effectively distributed to
meet needs in ways that were previously not possible.
Therefore, I have chosen to approach this evaluation in the
third manner discussed by Anderson. I have undertaken a
"systematic, objective, rigorous examination" of the policy
in order to determine whether it is accomplishing its
intended goal. (Anderson, 1982, p. 210) I trust the reader
will agree that I accomplished this objective.
One final observation regarding why I have used this
approach: in some areas there is a lack of information
which would have been needed to do a more detailed
comparative study. It would have been interesting to delve
more deeply into how the devolution changed administrative
structures and financial management practices. However,
much of this information is not available. It was neither
collected by the granting agencies nor saved by the grant
recipients. Any aspect of the program in which changes
could not be thoroughly studied and documented were not
included in this study.
Rossi and Freeman, in their book on research methods,
Evaluation: A Systematic Approach , point out that
the prerequisites of assessing the impact of
an intervention are as follows: First, ... the
project should have its objectives sufficiently
well articulated to make it possible to identify
measures of goal achievement... Second, the
intervention should have been sufficiently well
implemented for there to be no question that its
critical elements have been delivered to
appropriate targets. it is obvious that it wouldbe a waste of time, effort, and resources toestimate the impact of a program that lacks
measurable goals and has not been implementedproperly. (Rossi, Freeman, 1983, p. 187)
I have attempted to design and carry out this impact
analysis with this advice in mind.
As I stated earlier, the academic aspect of this study
was only one of two reasons I undertook it. The other is my
long-term personal involvement; I began working with the
CDBG program in a number of capacities in 1983. I have
written and been project director on grants and have
supervised others in all aspects of these programs.
While working in the field I regularly found that very
few of those working directly on these programs (and even
fewer of those working most closely with the final
recipients of the funds) ever consider the legal, political,
or philosophical background of these grants. The intake
people, who determine whether an applicants are eligible for
assistance in making their dwelling "decent, safe, and
sanitary," is not concerned with "congressional intent." A
new housing inspector, determining what work needs to be
done to accomplish a rehabilitation, cares little for
changes in statewide scoring procedures. A project manager,
responsible for overall program compliance, has probably not
considered the implications of the choice of the state
agency that administers the program.
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But these are the types of issues on which virtually
all of the present studies focus. There is no doubt that
these are important issues which must be studied if the
background and framework within which these programs must
operate is to be understood. But, in order to determine if
devolution has been successful, a closer analysis of the
program must be undertaken.
There is a need to assess how the people at the local
level are carrying out their responsibilities. Who is
writing the grants and why? How are localities interpreting
the priorities and scoring set by the state and how is their
interpretation affecting the quantity and type of
applications being written? By taking this study that one
more step and looking at the impact at the community level,
the answers to these questions should become clearer.
But why bother? What good is having such information?
Will such a study have implications which are no broader
than just to encompass a handful of communities in a small,
rural state? If so, it is, despite some local interest, not
worth the effort a study of this sort requires.
To avoid irrelevancy, I will attempt to use the infor-
mation gathered to determine whether the national measure-
ments being used are really accomplishing the purposes for
which they were enacted. Do they allow the money to be
disbursed as widely as it could be, thus maximizing the
number of potential recipients? Is the requirement that
CDBG funds would "principally benefit" low- and moderate-
income2 people both specific and flexible enough to allow
the other national and local objectives of the program to be
met? I believe the results of this study will be useful in
program design in a wider geographical area.
B. Objectives and Methodology
Although implicit in the above discussion, it seems
appropriate to specify the objectives of this study.
Knowing the methodology to be used to meet these objectives
and the general organization of this essay should help the
reader evaluate the conclusions.
Objective #1
The first objective of this outcome analysis is to
determine the changes at the state level which have been
caused by devolution. In order to do this, background on
the program has been provided. How was the money being
distributed among non-entitlement cities by HUD? What type
of projects were being emphasized under HUD and what
criteria were being used to choose the grantees of the
funds? Primary source data is available to answer these
questions and analysis of that data contained herein will
make clear what the national administration was emphasizing
in New Hampshire.
Then came the "Reagan Revolution" and his "Federalism
Initiative." Washington made it possible for the states to
2 This phrase has been changed in the last couple of years
to "low and very low." Because all of the documents and
records that will be used in this paper use the older
formulation, this paper will do the same.
8
take over administration of the program; and New Hampshire
(along with 35 other states and Puerto Rico), true to its
independent streak, welcomed the opportunity. The program
was given to the Office of State Planning to administer, the
implications of which will be discussed; and a Community
Development Advisory Committee was established to develop
policies and rules. in developing these policies and rules,
the Committee made a number of implicit and explicit policy
decisions which were later ratified by the Governor and
Council and by the Legislature. Discovering the results of
these decisions is the first objective.
Objective #2
After outlining the changes which have occurred since
the state took over, this analysis will then proceed to the
second objective: determining how these changes have
affected local communities. This is the heart of this
analysis and has been approached using both quantitative
analysis and interviews.
There is a multitude of primary source data that has
been used to establish statistical patterns. These patterns
should provide a snapshot of the program on a year by year
basis in a number of areas. First, we should be able to
determine how the changes in policies affected the grants
awarded. Have dollar amounts per grant increased or
decreased? Are multi-year grants still possible? Is
housing being emphasized more under the state's program than
it had been under HUD? The answers to these questions, and
others, will help us begin to understand the results of the
changes which occurred.
Next, this analysis has focussed more specifically on
the local response to the changes. How have the changes
affected the type of grants for which communities apply?
Are different communities applying? Have there been any
significant changes in the administration of the grants? Is
more of the administration being contracted out to
consulting firms or non-profit agencies (i.e., regional
planning agencies)? The answer to these guestions have
long- as well as short-term implications.
After analyzing this hard data it was then possible to
interview people who have been involved with the program
since HUD was administering it. These interviews
accomplished two things:
1
.
Extracted reactions to the statistical data
developed. Do the people who have been involved throughout
the years think that the statistics accurately reflect what
they have seen happening? And, in those areas where changes
have occurred, what do they perceive to be the reasons?
These interviews help identify the "whys" of the indicated
changes
.
2 . Extracted suggestions from these long-time
practitioners regarding improvements in program design and
implementation. These people have worked with the program
for over seven years, primarily on the local level, and
their insights and suggestions should be instructive.
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Objective #3
Lastly, the data has been compiled and analyzed to
determine whether the central question of this essay, "Has
the devolution of the Small Cities Program been successful;
has it improved the program?" can be answered.
C. Review of the Literature
Existing writing on the Community Development Block
Grant Program generally falls into one of three basic cate-
gories: 1) General overviews of changes which have occurred
using the explicit policy statements of state programs; 2)
use of data from one or more states to suggest general
changes which have taken place since the states have taken
over, and 3) effects of the devolution on the political
decisions made within entitlement cities.
This last category is of limited use in this study, but
these works do help clarify some of the general parameters
of the political in-fighting which can be expected. Sander
and Stone (1987), Wong and Peterson (1986) and Steger (1984)
are all particularly helpful in this regard. Dommel and
Rich (1987) take a broader view and highlight some changes
in the program which have led, according to their analysis,
to less needy cities receiving entitlement funding.
The literature that gives a general overview from the
perspective of the stated goals of various programs is
helpful for establishing background. Both Nanno (1983) and
Hershey (1983) wrote their articles before a significant
amount of hard statistical data was available and both take
11
a more traditional political science approach to the prob-
lem. Hershey provided an even-handed assessment of the
changes being proposed by the states; Nanno provided insight
into concerns that were then being expressed by those who
were not enthralled with the "Reagan Revolution" in the area
of housing.
The other category of articles are essentially compila-
tions of hard data gathered from the experiences in the
states. One of the most influential of these has been The
State CDBG Program: The First Year's Experience
, produced
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Other studies which followed generally imitate the format
and statistical analysis used in this work. In this study
HUD provided the statistical data on each of the 36 state
which chose to take over the program in 1983.
Herzik (1986) also takes a large cross section of
states and attempts to determine the effects of decentral-
ization. Morgan and England (1984) and Fossett (1987) are
both more limited in scope, focussing on one and four
states, respectively. In each instance the concern is on
the overall state perspective; no attempt is made to consid-
er the community impact.
This evaluation will delve into the central issue of
program beneficiaries and the major focus will be on the
local experience. Devolution had a significant impact on
non-entitlement cities; this analysis looks at that impact.
12
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CDBG PROGRAM
A. The Early Years
In 1974 Congress authorized three years of funding for
the Community Development Block Grant Program. Although the
legislative maneuvering which brought this about is fasci-
nating, any reader who desires more information can find
myriad articles and books written on the subject, and its
inclusion would add nothing of value to this paper. The
intent of the program, however, is significant.
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program,
as established in the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, was a major policy shift away from the centralizing
effects of the Great Society Programs of the 1960s. One of
the basic tenets of political science is that "power follows
money." Federal grant programs represent large sums of
money and, therefore, large reservoirs of power.
A major shift in the manner in which this money was
distributed was bound to have profound influence throughout
the political system. The CDBG Program did just that and
did it by design. President Ford said that the intention of
the program was to
...help return power from the banks of the Potomac
to the people in their own communities. Decisions
will be made at the local level. And responsi-
bility will be put squarely where it belongs
at the local level." (Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Vol.10, No. 34, p. 1060.)
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Although such high goals for a program seem like polit-
ical rhetoric, in fact the 1974 block grant program repre-
sented a major shift in the way the national government
approached community development. The new program folded
seven previously separate categorical grant programs
together into the newly developed block grant. 3 The
purpose, as President Ford implied, was to give local commu-
nities more flexibility to handle their problems in a way in
which they felt was most appropriate. Since notions of
"community development" and what makes for a positive
environment vary widely, not only among regions of the
nation, but even within states, this approach seemed
reasonable. This was especially true since by the mid-1970s
it was widely perceived that most of the "social
engineering" programs of the 1960s had not met their
original (possibly overly-) high expectations.
This is not to imply that the national government
intended to send buckets of money to the states to do with
as they pleased. The idea was to give some local discretion
and simplify the federal grant process to a degree, not
totally. The 1974 Act declares that "the future welfare of
3 These previous grants were: Urban Renewal under Title I of
the Housing Act of 1949; Model Cities under Title I of the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
1966; Water and Sewer Facilities Grants under Section 702 of
the Housing and Development Act of 1965, Neighborhood
Facilities grants under Section 703 of the Housing and
Development Act of 1965; Public Facilities Loans under Title
II of the Housing Act of 1961; Open Space Grants under Title
VI of the Housing Act of 1961; Rehabilitation Loans under
Section 312 of the Housing Assistance Act of 1964.
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the nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on the
establishment of viable urban communities as social, econom-
ic and political entities..." The stated main goal of this
Act was to foster "the creation of viable urban communi-
ties." The Act was designed to achieve this policy goal by
incorporation of a number of specific retirements
. The
central requirement, found in Section 104(b)(2), was that
communities must give "maximum feasible priority" to three
specific "Major Activities": Low- and moderate-income bene-
fit; the elimination of slums and blight; or the meeting of
an urgent community need.
Low- and Moderate- Income Benefit
The low- and-moderate income benefit objective was the
objective which was to have the most significant impact on
the design of projects under this program. Although many of
the categorical grants being folded in, because of the
intent of their programs, tended to serve a low- and
moderate-income clientele, the inclusion of this as a major
national objective would control program design in ways
unknown under the earlier grants. In the original Act,
Section 101(c) mandated that any projects supported by CDBG
funds would benefit "principally persons of low- and
moderate-income." Later, as we shall see, HUD during the
Carter Administration did its best to see that at least 51%
of the funds would be used to benefit low- and moderate-
income individuals. This essentially eliminated any project
which had a community-wide direct benefit unless 51% of the
15
entire population of the community were demonstrably low-
and moderate-income households. Because of the impact this
change would have on the program, HUD was never able to
convince Congress to change the legislation and had to rely
on their rules (which many area offices were willing to
"bend") to attempt to have this policy implemented.
National Objectives
In addition to these Major Activity areas, the Act
outlined seven National Objectives. These were supposedly
the means to achieving the goals. These seven stated objec-
tives were:
1. The elimination of slums and blight and the preven-
tion of blighting influences and the deterioration of prop-
erty and neighborhood and community facilities of importance
to the welfare of the community, principally persons of low-
and moderate-income;
2. The elimination of conditions which are detrimental
to health, safety, and public welfare, through code enforce-
ment, demolition, interim rehabilitation assistance, and
related activities;
3. The conservation and expansion of the nation's
housing stock in order to provide a decent home and a suit-
able living environment for all persons, but principally
those of low- and moderate-income;
4. The expansion and improvement of the quantity and
quality of community services, principally for persons of
low- and moderate-income, which are essential for sound
16
community development and for the development of viable
urban communities;
5. A more rational utilization of land and other
natural resources and the better arrangement of residential,
commercial, industrial recreational, and other needed activ-
ity centers;
6. The reduction of the isolation of income groups
within communities and geographical areas and the promotion
of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighbor-
hoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing oppor-
tunities for persons of lower income and revitalization of
deteriorating or deteriorated neighborhoods to attract
persons of higher income; and
7. The restoration and preservation of properties of
special value for historic, architectural, or aesthetic
reasons
.
These national goals and objectives had a tremendous
impact on the Discretionary Grant (Non-entitlement) portion
of the CDBG program. Since these discretionary grants
(restructured and renamed the Small Cities Program in 1978)
were awarded by HUD to communities on a competitive basis,
it was essential that an acceptable application be devel-
oped. In entitlement cities, the city officials could
negotiate with HUD officials over how funds which had al-
ready been granted to them (on a formula basis) would be
used; non-entitlement communities had no negotiating lever-
age. If HUD officials didn't think the project adequately
17
met the national objectives the community received no fund-
ing period.
Even in this brief introduction to the CDBG program the
origins of many of the issues which this paper will address
begin to emerge. From community to community it is evident
that different decision-making processes will produce dif-
ferent answers to community development Questions. These
different processes will also likely result in different
distribution of program benefits. The amount of mandated
requirements from above would seem to be a significant
factor in the eventual project design. This will become
clear as the reactions to the changes in mandated require-
ments occur.
B. The Carter Years
General Changes
The changes which occurred under the Carter administra-
tion were significant and affected nearly every aspect of
the program from project selection to implementation. Every
study on the program which deals with this time period
agrees with the assessment that in the 1977 - 1980 time
period "HUD became increasingly involved in various aspects
of local execution of the CDBG program." (Brookings, 1981,
p. 7)
There is nearly universal agreement on the cause as
well. Local discretion diminished as a result of "an ex-
plicit decision by top HUD officials in early 1977, just
after the Carter administration took office..." (Brookings,
18
1981, p. 183
,
This loss of discretion had an impact on many
areas and with the 1977 Reauthorization of the program many
of these changes became law.
One of the concerns that had been expressed about the
program since its inception was that, as a result of various
compromises under the original, the focus of the program was
"fuzzy." The Carter Administration sought to clarify this
focus by targeting the benefits to very specific
constituencies
.
On the national level, the allocation formula that had
been used for the entitlement portion of the grant was
joined by a second formula. This formula took into account
a different set of criteria (e.g., age of housing stock) and
so suggested a different resource allocation. This second
formula was weighted so that older, eastern cities scored
better. Politics being what it is, however, the second
system did not replace the first. Rather, a dual allocation
system was used and cities received an allocation based on
their highest score under the two systems.
Another major change which had the same aim as the dual
formula allocation system, aiding the most severely dis-
tressed cities, was the development of the Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG) Program. This program set aside a
certain amount of CDBG funds for the purpose of encouraging
the development of large projects in severely distressed
cities. Many office parks, hotels and waterfront rehabili-
19
tation projects were undertaken with UDAG funds/
The third major change, and the one most germane to
this study, was the development of the Small Cities Program.
This was really the first major restructuring of the non-
entitlement portion of the CDBG program since its inception.
The Discretionary Grant Program was finally coming into its
own through this restructuring. And, as one study ex-
plained, "As a result of these changes, the program devel-
oped a more standardized, quantitative selection procedure
and saw its funding allocation increase dramatically from
$438 million in 1977 to $926 million in 1981." (Bleakly et
al., 1983, p. 249)
In addition to these major program developments there
were explicit decisions to target benefits in two ways:
geographically and socially. In order to do this effective-
ly, administrative changes needed to be made. These were
especially important to the non-entitlement communities for,
as we've seen, the necessity of competing for funds required
them to design their applications according to HUD stan-
dards .
In fact, under the Small Cities program a municipality
might not even reach the "application" stage; a "pre-appli-
cation" was required of any community that wanted to be
considered for funding. The purpose of this was to save
both the communities and the HUD officials the bother of
4 The 1977 allocations were CDBG, $3.5 billion; UDAG, $400
million
.
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dealing with the fairly long, complex application form. m
the pre-application stage, a community would find out if
there was any reason to go through the application process.
In the pre-application stage HUD looked at the size of
the community, the needs outlined and the type of project
being proposed. They then scored these pre-applications
using four specific sub-competition areas: Metropolitan-
single purpose; metropolitan-comprehensive; non-metropoli-
tan-single purpose; and non-metropolitan-comprehensive.
Applications within each of these categories were selected,
and then HUD personnel solicited final applications from
those which they felt were most likely to score well under
their application procedure.
This screening process, although potentially unfair,
was a blessing in disguise to those communities which, for
whatever reasons, had no chance of receiving funding. The
actual application was complex and took considerable exper-
tise to prepare. Many consulting firms were born and many
regional planning agencies found a new source of available
funds because of these applications. Briefly, the applica-
tions asked for the following information:
1. A three-year community development and housing
plan. This needed to be sufficiently detailed to allow HUD
to compare the local plan with national objectives and to
determine how the community's request for funding would fit
within this three-year plan.
2. A listing of program activities by neighborhood
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rather than by activity. This was to make communities
address the issue of "geographic targeting" and make them
supply information on what share of the benefits would go to
these specific neighborhoods.
3. An explanation of how the program would benefit
low- and moderate-income households and what percentage of
the funds would go for that purpose. This was an attempt to
encourage municipalities to consider the "social targeting"
aspect of the program.
4. A detailed description of how public participation
requirements would be satisfied. The need for citizen
participation had been expanded with the reauthorization and
the application had to state clearly how these new require-
ments would be met.
In order to help communities deal with this process,
HUD produced two handbooks for the first time. These hand-
books, one essentially an internal document, the other for
general distribution, made it ever more clear that HUD was
going to keep a closer eye on how the funds were being
disbursed. For external distribution, HUD produced "Hand-
book 6503.1, Reviewing and Processing Community Development
Block Grant Entitlement Applications." For internal purpos-
es, HUD distributed "Handbook 6509.2 Rev., Community Plan-
ning Development Monitoring Handbook." Both of these hand-
books were released in March of 1979.
The application handbook essentially outlines the way
that various HUD regulations should be interpreted, although
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it provided little practical guidance for communities not
already familiar with the program. it did, however, give
specific examples of how to follow targeting guidelines and
what HUD would be expecting of communities when it came to
implementing this particular policy shift. The importance
of this handbook is that it demonstrates that HUD, by the
5th year of the program, was elaborating on the general
guidelines that had been given earlier. This, of course,
led to more centralized control.
This handbook required a yearly site visit to each
jurisdiction. 5 These visits would require the municipality
to sit down with the monitoring team and go, step by step,
over its program and its progress. These visits were not
only to determine whether all national objectives were being
met, but whether the projects were being carried out in a
"timely" and "efficient" manner. These looked at management
systems, financial recording keeping and general filing.
The effect of this handbook was to impose a specific stan-
dardized system that municipalities needed to adopt if they
wanted to avoid monitoring "findings." The interference of
HUD in administrative prerogatives irritated local offi-
cials. But it was the use of these monitoring visits to
determine whether communities were achieving HUD ' s targeting
priorities that had the most impact on the communities.
5 This "requirement" was apparently loosely applied. Each of
the people interviewed for this paper claimed that HUD only
monitored the projects at the very end. This was one of the
major problems many communities had under HUD.
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Social Targeting
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Programs toward low- and moderate-i come crtizens. I do not consider this to beDust an objective of the block grant program, it
al.! l9 80? p?
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So stated new HUD Secretary Patricia R. Harris to a
House subcommittee in March 1977, one month after taking
office. This turned out to be more than rhetoric. Over and
over this priority
- social targeting - became the standard
by which programs were judged.
As has been discussed, the CDBG program was designed to
give localities as much flexibility as possible in the
design of their programs. President Ford had stated that
flexibility was the REASON for the block grant. it was a
premise of the program that local officials had a good idea
what was needed in their communities to improve the quality
of life. Social targeting forced a change in the types of
applications generated.
One study's observation summarized the results of this
new highest priority. "Generally issues concerning benefits
to lower income groups, social targeting, dominated HUD-
local relations on substantive issues during the 3rd and 4th
years" (1977, 1978). (Dommel, et al., 1980, p. 49) This had
a tremendous impact on the types of applications funded in
New Hampshire, as will become evident later.
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Geographic Targeting
The idea of geographic targeting was, essentially, to
get "the most bang for the buck." This was to be done by
concentrating benefits in the smallest geographic area
possible, given the scope of the project. Applications were
to include "target areas" and these areas were to be as
compact and contiguous as possible. Identifiable and
natural neighborhood groupings were encouraged.
The Federal Register explains the concept of a target
area. It states that each area had to be primarily residen-
tial and must meet the following criteria:
...a slum or blighted area which is designated bythe applicant for concentrated treatment; such
area shall be of manageable size and condition,
physical and otherwise, so that block grant and
other resources to be committed to the area can
substantially meet the identified physical devel-
opment and housing needs with a three to five year
period. (Federal Register, Vol.42, no. 205, Octo-ber 25, 1977, p. 56465, sec. 570.301(a)(1)).
The same section of the Federal Register goes on to explain
the reason for this targeting:
It is HUD policy to encourage the use of block
grant funds in a concentrated manner in order to
produce substantial long-term improvements in the
community. The applicant is specifically encour-
aged to carry out a strategy for comprehensive
neighborhood revitalization which concentrates
sufficient resources to stabilize and upgrade
residential areas affected by blight and
deterioration. (Ibid, sec. 570.301(a)(3)).
The intent was clear, and when coupled with the fact
that low- and moderate-income benefit was to be the highest
priority, the program's focus on poor neighborhoods and
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"pockets of poverty was obvious. For larger cities, those
with such neighborhoods, this made some sense; for rural New
Hampshire, where a dilapidated mobile home is likely to be
situated in an otherwise middle-class neighborhood, diffi-
culties developed. Once again, this will be addressed
later
.
Other Significant Changes
There were two other changes made when the program was
reauthorized in 1977. Both of these related to program
focus and eligible activities. These changes were in the
areas of economic development and housing rehabilitation.
In the area of economic development, the 1977
amendments essentially took the CDBG program into a new
area. Since the beginning of the program the expansion of
economic opportunities was one goal of the block grant, but
interestingly, the original legislation did not include
economic development as one of the national objectives and
did not include economic development projects in the list of
eligible activities. In the 1977 reauthorization both of
these areas were addressed. The "expansion of economic
development" became the eighth national objective; it became
a separate "Major Activity" (along with Public Facilities
and Housing Rehabilitation) and a list of eligible economic
development activities was included.
By the same token, housing rehabilitation became an
activity, fully able to be funded on its own. Until this
time, housing rehabilitation could be done as part of a
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comprehensive grant which addressed other community needs as
well. Although many of the grants in the first two years
were mainly housing rehab, the reauthorization now made it
possible for applications to apply for money solely for
housing rehabilitation.
These changes, unlike social and geographic targeting,
did give communities somewhat more flexibility in developing
their applications.
Summary
The first six years of the program was a time of many
changes in the CDBG program. This is not surprising since
it was conceived under the Nixon administration and reauth-
orized under Carter. Most of the conclusions will, there-
fore, need to be modified; yet, some patterns emerge.
In general, the original intent of the program was
basically sound and being realized. Even after the Carter
administration tightened up, municipalities still had more
flexibility to design community development programs than
they did when the various grants were separate. This flexi-
bility allowed "comprehensive grants" to be used to fold
together a number of projects which, although part of an
overall community development strategy, were of various
types. This was especially true in entitlement cities but
worked in the Discretionary (Small Cities) program as well.
An important corollary to this flexibility is the
increase in local control of the funds. They were allowed
to design their own administrative structures. This was
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very important to small rural communities. Some did not
have and could not afford, the personnel required under
previous grants. The design of the CDBG program allowed
them to hire consultants or contract with Regional Planning
Agencies for administration. This was not as easy under the
older grants.
Although this flexibility was diminished under the
Carter administration, the basic ability of communities to
decide how the guidelines would be met remained. in some
way, the stricter guidelines, and especially the monitoring
handbook, gave local officials some idea of what HUD expect-
ed from them.
In the period after the 1977 reauthorization, target-
ing, both social and geographical, played a major role in
the program. This targeting strategy certainly achieved its
stated purpose: it forced grant recipients to focus their
efforts on low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. To do
this, communities needed to develop very specific neighbor-
hood revitalization strategies.
Generally, during the early years of the program, most
of the funds in non-metropolitan areas were spent on two
categories of activities: housing rehabilitation and neigh-
borhood conservation. 6 But the changing distribution of
the funds between the two areas reveal an interesting trend.
6 Neighborhood conservation consisted of such items as
infrastructure improvements and historic preservation
activities; typical "neighborhood revitalization" efforts.
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As the table below shows, in 1976 37% of the program
allocation in non-metropolitan areas went to housing reha-
bilitation activities; only 23% was used for neighborhood
conservation. This shows very clearly the effect nationwide
that targeting was having on the distribution of these
funds
.
TABLE 1
PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS IN NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS (%)
YEAR
Housing Rehabilitation
Neighborhood
Conservation
Social Services
General Improvements
Urban Renewal
Economic Development
Multiple Use
The changes which occurred during the first six years
of the program reflected the political and social changes
happening in America. The flexible nature of the CDBG
structure encouraged just such an evolution. But the big-
gest changes were yet to come, for in 1980 Ronald Reagan
defeated Jimmy Carter for the Presidency.
C. The Reagan Revolution
The 1981 Reauthorization
Like the Carter administration before it, the Reagan
people at HUD wasted no time in their efforts to reflect the
new president's ideological stand on the CDBG program. On
May 15, 1981, new HUD Secretary Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. had a
notice issued to HUD staff members in Washington and all of
1975 1976 1977 1978
28 37 37 22
23 23 22 45
18 10 6 7
10 4 3 2
4 14 22 11
1 4 4 2
3 1 0 0
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the HUD field offices. This notice changed the procedures
governing the review of local applications and some of the
more offensive (to local officials) review procedures were
eliminated. But this was just the beginning: the Act needed
to be reauthorized in 1981; that was where the big changes
occurred
.
These changes were for big stakes. The funding for the
Small Cities portion of the CDBG program had increased from
$259 million in 1975 to $926 million in 1981. Given the
power that is tied to figures like that, it is no wonder
that the idea of allowing the states to determine how the
funds would be distributed met with some opposition in
Washington, D.C.
Once again, the process by which these major changes
occurred will not be analyzed here. It seems safe to say,
however, that the overwhelming electoral victory of the new
President gave the administration the ability to move for-
ward on its agenda during this first year in office. The
1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which contained the
block grant reauthorization, was a central piece in the
administration plan.
This reauthorization was designed to reduce the role of
the national government in the block grant program which had
developed during the Carter administration, and to go beyond
that to help implement Reagan's version of New Federalism.
The main aspects of this reauthorization included:
1
. Elimination of the reguirement that a municipality
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develop a "written citizen participation plan."
2. Change of eligible activities as follows:
A. Allowed assistance to for-profit businesses.
B. Allowed funds to be used for comprehensive planning
purposes
.
C Put a ten percent cap per grant award on public
service spending.
3. Elimination of state application process in favor of a
mandatory final statement. This eliminated HUD • s ability to
have major impact at the front end of the process, although
they still needed to "formally award the annual grant."
A. States became much freer to develop purposes and
procedures for distributing funds as state and local
priorities dictated.
B. States, of course, did need to develop their final
statement within certain federal guidelines.
Immediately implemented, these changes had a major
effect on HUD's administration of the program. It was a
small step by the administration toward allowing the
localities more control over CDBG funds. The localities
responded guickly. (Dommel, et al., 1983)
...the amount of change found so soon after
the policy changes were instituted was surprising.
This was most evident in the new interest in
economic development in some cities, but occurred
also in other aspects of local programming such as
the decision in a few cities to spread activities
across a wider geographic area." (Dommel, et al.,
1983, p. 12)
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But these changes applied to all grantees - entitlement
and non-entitlement alike. The profoundly systemic change
that occurred as a result of this reauthorization was the
provision that allowed the states to begin administering the
Small Cities program. This change covered all aspects of the
administration, from setting priorities for the grants to
the monitoring and evaluation. HUD
' s role would be to verify
guidelines set by the legislation. They would do this at
both the front end, by evaluating a state's "Final State-
ment" and, later, by evaluating their program performance.
The process for the yearly grant award changed much
more than the annual monitoring. Prior to this reauthor-
ization, the state needed to request its allocation by
engaging in a lengthy and time consuming application
process. It was through this process that HUD exerted its
impact in the process, asking for a significant amount of
data and requiring that the states show how they intended to
comply with the myriad of program regulations.
The reauthorization eliminated the application process
entirely. Instead, the states needed to provide a "Final
Statement" which would describe in detail the objectives,
projected use and method for allocating the funds.
This new process gave the states much more leeway in
developing their own goals, priorities and procedures. They
could focus much more specifically on what they knew to be
the priorities within the municipalities in their states.
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Still, the states did need to develop their final
statements within certain national guidelines. Even within
these guidelines, some major changes occurred. Some of these
changes gave the states even more flexibility in program
design than HUD had enjoyed. For one thing, the altered
legislation made three major changes regarding what
activities were eligible for funding under the program.
First, the legislation put a 10 percent cap per grant
award on public service spending. Prior to this, many
municipalities had been using these funds to run community
development programs similar to HUD
' s Community Action
Program (CAP) neighborhood centers. Primarily, these funds
were being used to fund personnel to do outreach work and to
furnish assistance to residents of "targeted" neighborhoods.
Second, CDBG funds could be used for comprehensive
planning purposes. This was very important in many small to
mid-sized municipalities which had an inadeguate
comprehensive (Master) plan or none at all. Obviously, if
Community Development funds were going to be used
effectively, an overall direction needed to be developed. As
a practical matter, most states were going to be reguiring
the existence of such a plan if a municipality were going to
receive funds. In some states it became a reguirement; in
some it was a factor in scoring. Since such plans, if
developed properly, can cost in the tens of thousands of
dollars for even a small town, funding assistance was vital
in many areas.
33
nThird, the reauthorization allowed assistance to for-
profit businesses. Until this time, economic development
money generally was channelled through non-profit
development corporations. This legislation said that under
certain circumstances loans could be given directly to the
business themselves. This opened up possibilities for
economic development activities that were simply not
available before.
Cumulatively, these changes had significant affects
even on those municipalities which had been previously
involved in the program. Clearly, they reflected the Reaga
notion of community development: they were designed to
shift money away from public services and instead allow for
infrastructure and economic development activities.
D. The First Year Experience
Before dealing specifically with what happened in New
Hampshire when the state assumed responsibility for the
program, it is interesting to review the immediate effects
that the devolution had nationwide. A look at the results of
a study, "The State CDBG Programs: The First Year's
Experience," is instructive.
This study was done in May of 1983 for the Office of
Policy Development and Research of HUD by a policy research
firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This study had two major
ob j ectives
:
1) to provide a clear description of the first year
transition of the Small Cities Program to state control; and
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2) to describe shifts in types of community development
activities, the response of local government officials to
state programs, and state uses of greater flexibility to
meet small city needs. (5)
This study was done over a six months period soon after
the states first began administration. Therefore, reviewing
it will give indications of the immediate effects of the
devolution. The patterns and precedents established nation-
wide will provide a comparative framework for the reader
when the study turns to New Hampshire.
Methodology
The study actually had two levels of participation in
which we are interested:
1) An inventory of the "basic program characteristics"
of the 37 original participants. This involved analyzing the
final statement and program design of each state;
2) A more intensive analysis of 10 randomly selected
states, including "state-level or site interviews, an
analysis of applications and telephone surveys of applicant
and non-applicant communities ."( 1
)
The statistics used in the summary will be identified
as to whether they come from the total participant study, or
the 10-state sampling.
The study broke its area of inguiry into a number of
discrete sections. In an attempt to portray the results of
the study as accurately as possible, the categories found in
the study will be used here.
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State Priorities
This study made three major points regarding state
program priorities:
1) "States... are using the flexibility given in program
design to re-target the program to their own priorities."
(iii) This was especially evident in the area of economic
development. In "33 of the states, and 11 of 12 sample
states" economic development activities were encouraged by
the announced program priorities. And even more, overall, 39
percent of the funds in states with competitive systems were
set aside for economic development projects. (251)
2) "States are attempting to weave their program
priorities into the administrative structure of their
programs.." (iii) The way this was done was through program
design. Although program design may seem like an obvious way
to ensure that specific priorities are achieved, the states
were much more explicit than HUD in doing this. HUD
' s scor-
ing system, as we shall see when we compare it with New
Hampshire's, was relatively simple.
This flexibility was used by HUD regional offices to
emphasize the priorities they believed were important in
their districts. For example, the CDBG program in New
England under HUD was more involved in housing rehabili-
tation activities than anywhere else in the country. This
seems to have been primarily because the aging housing stock
in the region was more of a problem than in other areas.
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3) "Local awareness of program priorities is generally
high, but varies considerably among states
."( iii
)
State Program Design
The study determined, after an analysis of all 37
participants, the following things regarding state program
design
:
1) "Most states have made the CDBG program part of
their existing community and economic development
structure. "(iii) The study found that the participants are
placing administrative responsibility for the program
"within already existing departments or divisions involved
with community affairs, economic development, and/or
planning.
" (42) This situation is not as simple as it seems,
however. In many states the program could have been placed
in other, also logical places, with a different emphasis
resulting.
For example, in Connecticut the program was placed with
the Department of Housing. It could have just as easily been
placed within the Department of Economic Development or the
Office of Planning and Management
.( 45 ) It was not within the
scope of the study to analyze the placement decisions.
2) "States have overwhelming chosen competitively-based
systems of distributing their programs funds. "(iii) This
allows them to focus their efforts on these projects which
address the states' priorities. The program designs did this
by establishing certain threshold requirements and through
their scoring system criteria.
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Threshold Requirements
The threshold requirements were the first part of the
program design which forced localities to determine whether
they were willing to comply with the states' requirements.
The three most frequently used (singly or in combination)
were special administrative requirements, a local match, and
specific low- and moderate-income benefit requirements. The
special administrative requirement threshold usually forced
the applicant community to guarantee that they would provide
a certain level of administrative structure if they received
grant funds. This ranged from hiring a single grant admin-
istrator to setting up a community development office. This
requirement came from a recognition of the fact that these
grants required a significant amount of administration (and
paperwork). The perceived lack of administrative expertise
in the smaller communities was the generally accepted reason
why HUD avoided providing CDBG funds to the smaller communi-
ties .
A local match was a threshold requirement in most
states. This could require anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of
total project costs coming from the community receiving the
funds. This presumably showed a commitment on the part of
the community and also helped encourage economic development
projects, a nearly universal priority of the states.
Many states also designated a specific level of low-
and moderate-income benefit as a threshold requirement.
Althouqh low- and moderate-benefit was one of the three
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major national objectives of the program, Congress never set
a speoific level which needed to be achieved. This typically
was 50 percent, but some states went as high as 75 percent.
Scoring Criteria
The Scoring Systems set up in the states were the
second way which states guaranteed that their priorities
would be reflected in the program design. Scoring systems
generally were designed to very carefully lead communities
to develop applications which contained those projects the
states were interested in funding.
By far, the most used selection factor was "impact."
Applicants needed to demonstrate that something needed to be
done. Ninety-one percent of the communities made this
criterion one of their major factors. This was also, by the
way, one of the major factors used by HUD.
Another major selection factor, used by 76 percent of
the 37 communities, was a measure of community need. This
was a factor which the communities had no control over and
was determined generally by looking at census data on either
percentage of persons in the community who were living in
low- and moderate- households or median income of the people
in a community
.( 82
)
This criterion was something which the applicant had no
control over and tended to funnel the funds to the poorest
communities in a state.
The third selection criteria used by a majority of the
states (76%) was percentage of low- and moderate-income
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benefits. This was used in many states as both a threshold
requirement and as a scoring element. This forced applicant
communities to design their program to focus specifically on
this income group - otherwise they were risking a lower
score and possibly not obtaining funds. Most public facili-
ties projects have a problem with this criterion.
The fourth major scoring criterion (which was also used
by 76 percent of the states) was leveraging ratio; the
amount of non-CDBG funding that would be used in the
projects. This also encouraged communities to look at
economic development activities, where two or three to one
matches (private to CDBG funds) are easy to design into a
project; housing rehabilitation projects in single family
homes are difficult to develop. (76, 77)
Procedures
The next area that the HUD study addresses is
procedures that the states have established. Although many
specific areas are addressed, only the following are
relevant here.
1) The application processes developed by the states
were generally well received in the communities, (vi) This
was usually because all the applicants, winners and losers,
felt the states had simplified the requirements. The
responses to the following three questions graphically
summarizes these findings.
Does the state application do a better job of allowing
your community to address local needs that HUD?
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WINNERS LOSERS
Percentage saying better 71 61
Percentage saying not better 29 39
Did the state application process require more
paperwork than HUD?
Percentage saying more 22 n
Percentage saying some amount more 30 28
Percentage saying less 48 61
Did the state application require more data than HUD
had?
Percentage saying more 19 lg
Percentage saying same 37 38
Percentage saying less 44 43
2) "States are developing their monitoring strategies
with 3 principal objects in mind: a. federal program
requirements; b. monitorinq; c. detecting problems early."
(v)
The monitoring process was always one of the chief com-
plaints communities had with HUD. Its procedure was only
designed to catch violations after the fact, resulting in
penalties being assessed. The states, while carrying out
their mandated responsibilities under the federal guide-
lines, generally attempted to help the communities comply.
In fact, the states did various things to provide technical
assistance throughout the grant period, and most saw the
formal monitoring visit as an extension of their outreach
and assistance.
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3) Two of the findings are related. First, they found
that the states were actually " mor e concerned with ensuring
success than in lessening their program's administrative
burden."
(
V
) Not surprising, then, was their finding that
"states report mixed results in their efforts to lessen
program administrative burden. (v)
These findings are not surprising. Although the states
were given flexibility in program design, they were not
given leeway in what needed to be reported to the federal
government. They were now responsible for gathering the
information and ensuring compliance with the federal
regulations, as HUD had been before them. In many cases,
grantees found themselves providing not only the information
still required under federal rules, but additional
information the state needed to begin building a data base.
Outcomes
Another area discussed is termed program outcomes,
although this terminology as applied here is somewhat mis-
leading. The focus of the study is the changes in the
transition in program and grant types caused by the devolu-
tion, not the grants themselves. Therefore, the outcome
being discussed is the outcome of the programmatic changes;
in other words, how have the changes affected who receives
funding? The finding are therefore related to changes in
the type of applicants, grantees and grants being awarded.
1) Probably most significantly for this study is the
finding that "the state CDBG Program is attracting a larger
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number of applicants... and a greater number, but smaller
percentage, of these applicants receive funding.
"
(vii) The
study found that there was, overall, a 52 percent increase
in the number of applicants over the previous year. (vii)
Another way of looking at this increased participation is
that in 1981, under HUD, 18.7 percent of the eligible
municipalities in the 37 states under consideration applied
for grants. In 1982, under state administration, 39.7
percent of eligible communities put in applications.
Obviously, this is a significant increase in participation.
2) State CDBG applicants are smaller but as with the
previous federal programs, grantees tend to be significantly
larger than the applicants (vii). The average size of state
applicants had a population of 4,539, the average population
of grantees was 10,567 (252).
3) "Prior experience appears to be related to
application success ." (vii ) Although those applicants with
prior experience had a significantly better chance of
receiving funding, this can be accounted for in two ways.
First, prior grantees would have the grant-writing and
administrative capacity necessary for developing a
successful application. Second, prior grantees would tend to
be communities with demonstrable needs.
4) Applicants who proposed Economic Development or
Housing Rehabilitation projects have a higher probability of
being funded than applicants who propose public facilities
grants. (vii) As the chart shows, this is especially true of
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economic development grants, which, as has been mentioned
before, were a priority of most states. (124)
TABLE 2
APPLICANTS AND GRANTEES BY PROJECT TYPE
TYPE
Economic development APPLICANTS GRANTEES
Public facilities ll* 19 *
Housing rehabilitation 18 23
This analysis of outcomes shows the importance to the
communities of the devolution.
Local Effects
Lastly, the report looks at what effects the devolution
had on the towns and cities of the states. This research was
done as part of the 10-state in-depth visitation and inter-
view process and reflects the view of both applicant and
non-applicant communities.
1) States, it was found, have "made significant efforts
to involve local communities" and, no doubt partly because
of this, "local officials tend to have positive overall
impressions of state administration ."( ix)
The states, as has been discussed, generally developed
their programs with a heavy emphasis on local technical
assistance. In many cases, they even provided money to sub-
state organizations, such as regional planning commissions,
to allow greater outreach and assistance to be provided to
communities. This effort the study found, was appreciated by
communities, even those which did not ultimately participate
in the program.
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The study did examine why some communities were exclud-
ed from participation. Generally, it found smaller communi-
ties continued to find it difficult to compete under state
administration. Partly, it found that the threshold re-
quirements and scoring systems tended to work against the
smaller communities. This was especially true in those
states which emphasized the importance of the localities
proving administrative capacity or providing specific admin-
istrative structures. In fact, the report states that "sev-
eral program administrators noted that attracting and fund-
ing worthwhile economic development projects from smaller
communities was difficult since they often lacked the admin-
istrative capacity to carry out a complex economic develop-
ment program. "(253) Since, as has been noted several times,
a vast majority of participant states were attempting to
make economic development a higher priority, this posed a
significant stumbling block.
From the local perspective, the reason most often
stated (by 30 percent of non-applicants) as a primary factor
in non-participation was categorized as "criteria problems."
The specific concerns "included state targeting require-
ments, demographic needs factors, and provisions for lever-
aging other public or private resources ."( 233
)
Twenty percent (making it the second most frequently
mentioned reason) of the non-applicants stated merely that
they "did not need the grant." (234)
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The third major reason, given by 13 percent of the non-
applicants, was lack of sufficient resources." Not surpris-
ing the study found that "communities with populations less
than 7,500 appear more likely than larger localities to
claim insufficient resources for grant preparation. (233)
2. The second major finding in the study with regards
to localities was that, "state program priorities were not
always in complete agreement with the priorities expressed
by local communities ."( 250 ) This result of this can be seen
in the earlier discussion of program outcomes. In the table
presented there, it showed that the localities were more
focussed on public facilities projects, but the states were
interested in funding economic development projects. Al-
though the reasons, many of which have been discussed, for
each side are understandable, the differences have discour-
aged many communities from participating.
Summary
This report summary of the initial participants experi-
ences with state CDBG administration has been presented to
give the reader a framework for understanding the rest of
this study. New Hampshire's decisions were made with the
same background and in the same context as these first year
participants. The similarities and differences will illum-
inate these areas that suggest a need for closer scrutiny.
Also, this summary makes it clear that this devolution
was a major turning point in federal-state-local relation-
ship. The various priorities that states developed, new
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threshold requirements and vastly altered scoring criteria
all led to a new focus for the use of the CDBG funds.
Finally, and most importantly, several general issues
were highlighted in the executive summary of the report that
have direct bearing on the major focus of this study. These
relate directly to how the communities reacted to the devo-
lution of the program:
While most states attempted to target theirprograms to smaller, less experienced communities,tnere were few differences between the
characteristics of grantees under the state andthe previous federal program. States were able to
attract smaller sized applicants than the formerprograms, yet state selected grantees did notdiffer in size from the prior small cities
program. This indicates that it may be moredifficult than was first imagined by state policy
makers to alter the type of communities who
successfully apply to the program and that the
techniques used by the states to attract a
different mix of communities were not always
effective.
"
(xi)
This is an important issue. The basis of this study is
that in New Hampshire the program is working, that there has
been a greater distribution of funds, allowing smaller
communities to participate. The background of information
provided which suggests why others have not succeeded,
compared with information on why New Hampshire has, should
suggest certain policy areas that are important to this
program.
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CHAPTER III
COMPARISON OF HUD'S AND OSP
• S ADMINISTRATIONS
A. Background
The State of New Hampshire officially assumed
responsibility for the CDBG Program on July 1, 1983
, the day
Governor John Sununu submitted the state's "Final Statement"
on how the program would be operated. As in all changes of
this magnitude, this move had been in the planning stage for
some time.
As soon as the Federal enabling legislation passed in
1981, New Hampshire officials, believing the funds could be
spent in a manner more beneficial to the people of the state
if local control and flexibility could be enhanced, began
taking the steps necessary to prepare themselves for the
added responsibilities. In January of 1983 Governor Sununu
proposed to the New Hampshire Legislature that the state
assume this responsibility. In early June the Legislature
approved the plan and the Governor guickly moved forward.
B. Regulations
In order to understand the different outcomes of the
two programs it is important that the regulations be
compared. Looking at these differences should begin to make
clear why local communities acted as they did when deciding
whether to apply for funding and for what type of projects.
The documents that will be compared are:
For HUD
1. HUD NOTICE CPD 82-9 "The Small Cities Program Review
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Process Statement" dated July 30, 1982.
2. US Dept of Housing and Urban Development Community
Development Block Grant Program: Instructions for the
Applications for Community Development Block Grant Funds,
Small Cities Program HUD-4124, (7-82).
For OSP
1. Final Statement for the 1983 State of New Hampshire
Community Development Block Grant Small Cities Program:
State of New Hampshire Office of State Planning June 1983.
2. The Small Cities CDBG Program Community Development
Grants, Job Bill Grants and Feasibility Grants Application
Process Final Rules, Office of State Planning State of New
Hampshire November 22, 1983.
Comparing the rules used by HUD during its last year
administering the program and the rules used by the state
during its first year most clearly illustrates the changes
specifically caused by the devolution. Obviously, if the
comparison had been made between HUD s first year and the
state's first year, the differences would have been greater.
As has been outlined, these were many changes during HUD *
s
administration in all aspects of the program. And, if the
eighth year of the state's administration had been used, the
"maturing" of the regulations would have suggested other
areas of interest.
Those changes tend to balance out over the sixteen year
study period under consideration. As the data on grants
applied for and awarded in the next section is analyzed,
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these changes will be seen. But by looking at the two sets
of regulations under consideration, these areas of HUD
administration which New Hampshire wanted changed can be
clearly seen.
C Objectives
As the history of the program under HUD has shown, the
primary objective of the program had remained fairly consis-
tent throughout. As expressed in the program Review Process
Statement (RPS ), the "primary objective of the program is
the development of viable communities by providing decent
housing and a suitable living environment, and expanding
economic opportunities, principally for persons of low- and
moderate-incomes." (HUD, 1982, p. 6)
This primary objective was to be achieved by developing
the program regulations so that "maximum feasible priority-
would be given to activities which will meet the three broad
national objectives which had been enumerated in the origi-
nal legislation:
1. benefit to low- and moderate-income families,
2. the prevention or elimination of slums or blight,
3. other community development activities "having a
particular urgency because existing conditions pose a
serious threat to the health or welfare of the community"
and where other private or public sources of funds are not
available to meet the need. (HUD, 1982, p. 6)
These broad objectives were in place from day one and
remain in force today. But a deliberate and significant
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change was made to the primary objective when the state
began adjusting the program.
The final statement, which was required by HUD of any
states who would be administering the program, declared that
aoa?
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t0 State le
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islat i°n, the program's primaryg l is t improve and maintain housing and the
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economic and physical development of the state'smunrcrpalrties so as to enhance the qualify of life for
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The Final Statement goes on to make sure it was
understood that "the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development will closely monitor the state's conformance to
the national objectives" of the CDBG program. (OSP, 1983a,
p. 2)
A close analysis of these primary objective statements
shows two subtle but significant shifts. First, HUD
' s state-
ment began by saying that the primary purpose was 'the
development of viable communities." This concern reflected a
primary purpose of one of the program's ancestors: The Model
Cities Program. This concern for livability was one of the
hallmarks of the Great Society goals of the 1960s. New
Hampshire's statement contains no equivalent goal.
This change of attitude was reflected in a major change
in the program: The complete elimination of comprehensive
and multi-year grants. 7
7 Although technically there were two separate aspects of
the program under HUD, as a practical matter, in order to
guarantee enough funds to carry out a comprehensive program,
given the annual grant limits, virtually all of the grants
distributed in New Hampshire were multi-year grants.
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It had been the practice under HUD for a municipality
to receive a grant for a project area that required, for
example, extensive housing rehabilitation coupled with
sidewalk and storefront improvements. This was done under
the auspices of developing viable communities.
The state priority did not include this comprehensive
vision. Rather, it suggested an emphasis on specific pro-
jects and down-played the overall community aspects of the
program. It was required by federal regulation that the
state finish funding those comprehensive grants that HUD had
already committed to, but the state did not approve any
further comprehensive projects.
D. Low- and Moderate- Income Benefit
The second major shift in emphasis between the primary
objective statements of HUD and New Hampshire was the chang-
ing emphasis on low- and moderate-income benefit. Although
at first glance the wording is similar, closer examination
shows a difference that was evident in the program.
HUD's statement ends with the phrase "principally for
persons of low- and moderate-income." This, as the history
of HUD's administration has shown, was interpreted in vari-
ous ways. But never did Congress translate this into a
specific, quantitative requirement.
New Hampshire's personnel, on the other hand, did not
just add this criterion to their primary objective, they
made it a central focus. The primary goal says the
activities will be designed to "enhance the quality of life
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for low- and moderate-income New Hampshire residents." To
back this up, OSP's regulations require that 51 percent of
the funds of every project must "directly benefit" these
income groups.
To some degree, this change also led to the elimination
of comprehensive grants. Unlike more industrialized states,
much of rural New Hampshire's poverty is found in small
pockets among less distressed areas. Typically, development
has occurred in such a way that there are one or two streets
in each neighborhood that tend to be most distressed, other
low- and moderate-income households are disbursed throughout
the smaller communities.
Since the comprehensive grants relied on the ability of
towns to target neighborhoods, the state's further emphasis
on low- and moderate-income benefit made it such more
difficult to develop a project area. A brief example will
make this clear.
If a town proposed a sewer line extension that would,
after passing several streets, enter an area of low- and
moderate-income households, HUD would have looked at the
"principal" benefit to those households at the end of line.
It would have been possible to do such a project under their
guidelines
.
With New Hampshire's emphasis on low- and moderate-
income benefit and the requirement that more than 51 percent
of the beneficiaries fall within this income group, a survey
would be needed that would cover each household on each
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street the entire length of the new sewer line. Once again,
the demographics of New Hampshire make such a finding
extremely difficult. This forces a very narrow focus on
projects and makes comprehensive strategies nearly
impossible
.
These two general changes in focus show up again and
again in the administration of the two programs. This will
become even more evident during the later, closer, analysis
of the two programs. But this was not the only significant
change. There were a number of others. One of these,
threshold factors, directly reflects on one of these major
priority changes as has already been briefly discussed.
HUD's only threshold factors were capacity and perfor-
mance which, for previous grantees, involved "an examination
of the applicants previous record in carrying out a CDBG or
other HUD-approved program." First time applicants, "unless
generally available facts raise a question concerning an
applicant's capacity" existed, were "assumed to have the
capacity to undertake their programs ."( HUD, 1982, p. 11)
There were no other requirements that would cause an
application to be rejected without scoring.
New Hampshire's staff went further. They picked up,
nearly verbatim, HUD
' s section on capacity and performance.
They required a certification of compliance, a requirement
of the federal regulations that makes communities agree to
comply with all applicable federal and state laws and
regulations. And, as has been discussed briefly, they went
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further than HUD and required that more than half of the
funds would be used for low- and moderate-income benefit.
This requirement was explained in OSP • s Final Rules as
follows
:
At least fifty-one (51) percent of the fundsrequested shall be used for direct benefit to low
sSaird^ 6 ; 111^6 farailies "- Municipalities
submlttfnn H^^ 6 CrPllanCe With thi * r^est byf . daa such as surveys, census data orProjections of employers proposing to use
use2 L fZ, eCOn°miC d5vel°Pment. The methodologyd to determme such benefit shall be describedin the application. (OSP, 1983b, p. 6)
OSP's staff takes this requirement very seriously.
After rejecting at least two applications (with which this
author is familiar) they eventually put together a workshop
and handbook on doing statistically valid surveys.
E. Eligibility
Another area in which there was a distinction made
between HUD and New Hampshire's CDBG programs was which
levels of government were eligible to apply. HUD specified
that "small cities (in general, units of local government
with less than 50,000 population), and counties" (HUD, 1982,
p. 8) were eligible. New Hampshire chose to handle the
matter differently.
In the Final Statement, the "state legislation requires
the OSP to solicit applications from all eligible municipal-
ities... the intent... is to increase the number of municipal-
ities participating in the program." (HUD, 1982, p. 2) This
clearly suggests that only municipalities can be applicants
and, in fact, the Final Rules make that clear, under
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Eligibility of Applicants, only
"incorporated cities and
towns" can apply. However, if a city or town SQ desires ^
"may apply on behalf of village districts, counties and non-
profit corporations for eligible activities to be undertaken
within that municipality provided it accepts full responsi-
bility for grant administration." (OSP, 1983b, p. 3) The
staff at OSP made the decision that working through munici-
palities was the best way to administer the program.
F. Activities
Although, as will be evident when scoring is discussed,
HUD and New Hampshire had different ways of choosing pro-
jects, generally the projects allowed were similar. Compre-
hensive grants, discussed earlier, were allowed under HUD
but not under OSP. Single-purpose grants were very similar;
each allowed grant applications in three categories: hous-
ing, public facilities, and economic development.
When broken down further, specifically into those areas
of eligible activities, New Hampshire's Final Statement
outlined the following activities:
(1) the acguisition, rehabilitation or expansion
of housing;
(2) the creation, retention, and expansion of
employment through the stimulation of private
investment and community revitalization
activities
;
(3) the installation, rehabilitation, and
replacement of public facilities;
(4) activities that test the feasibility of
innovations approaches to community development,
and
(5) activities that provide timely responses to
unpredictable circumstances or special development
opportunities. (OSP 1983a, p. 2)
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Four of these activities track very closely with those
activities which HUD had been funding. The one new activity
which New Hampshire added was number four, dealing with
feasibility grants.
The idea of feasibility grants also ties with a state-
ment in the final statement that New Hampshire will provide
both "financial and technical support" for these activities.
The state made a conscious decision to help communities that
otherwise would be unable to develop applications.
Specifically, feasibility grants were designed to
provide municipalities with up to $15,000 to help communi-
ties develop grant applications. Eligible activities under
these grants include "the study and analysis of any program
activity, including architectural/ engineering pre-design."
(OSP, 1983b, p. 5)
The addition of feasibility grants made it possible for
small towns to get help in grant preparation. Many towns
contracted with regional planning agencies (RPAs) to develop
the fairly simple feasibility grant application. The
understanding between the towns and the RPAs was that if the
feasibility grant was funded, the towns would contract with
the agency to use the money to prepare the more complicated
full CDBG applications. The OSP encouraged this arrangement
and it worked very well around the state.
G. Scoring
Since the scores received by the applicants ultimately
determines which municipalities will get funds, any change
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in focus is important. Therefore, it is necessary to take a
fairly close look at the scoring process.
HUD
' s Approach
Under HUD, scoring for single purpose* grants was as
follows
:
TABLE 3
HUD SCORING SYSTEM
RATING FACTOR p0INT^
NEED
Absolute number of poverty persons 75Percentage of poverty persons 75
PROGRAM IMPACT Ann4 00
PERFORMANCE
Fair Housing Compliance 40Local Egual Opportunity Efforts 25
TOTAL
_ c625
HUD explained each of these factors as follows:
Need
The need factors totaled 150 points, or just under 25%
of the total available points. The community had no control
over these factors; the data was compiled by HUD from Census
data. Point values were assigned by determining
the community in each competition with the highest
numbers and percentages, and then (assigning)
points to the other applicants in the competition
using the highest rated community as a base. (HUD,
1982, p. 20)
Since OSP does not have a category for comprehensive
grants the discussion of scoring will focus exclusively on
single purpose grants.
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Overall Impact
HUD assigned points for Impact based on the three major
grant categories. within each category the assigned points
as follows: Maximum Impact - 400 points; Moderate - 200;
insignificant
- 0. in order to receive the 400 points, each
category had a number of factors which must be evident. A
few examples from each category are illustrative.
Housing Impact
In order to receive the maximum 400 point in the Housing
category the applicant, among other things, must be able to
show that:
1. "Need is clearly described and quantified, is
serious and will be significantly impacted by the proposed
project." Examples: a. "Number of substandard housing
units and structures and seriousness of substandard
conditions based on recent data or surveys." b. "High
vacancy rate .
"
2. "Rehabilitation will bring units up to at least
Section 8 housing quality standards and will also meet
energy conservation standards."
3. There will be leveraging of other public or private
funds
.
Public Facilities Impact
In order to receive the maximum points in the Public
Facilities category the applicant must be able to show:
1. Demonstrated need, for example:
a. "inadequate drainage facilities";
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b. "lack of adequate sewage disposal... which
create health hazards";
c. "lack of adequate water supply."
2. That there is a "clearly defined need for federal
resources based on lack of local and other public and
private resources to carry out the project."
3. There is other sources of private and public
funding to leverage the CDBG funds.
Economic Development Impact
In order to receive the maximum points in the Economic
Development category the applicant must be able to show:
1. Need, for example:
a. high unemployment
b. "severely limited tax base"
c. "lack or potential loss of basic neighborhood
business services".
2. "The amount of federal dollar per permanent job
created or retained is low, the private to federal
investment ratio is high, or the tax revenue increase is
significant .
"
Performance
The last major area of scoring is performance, which
has two distinct parts, Fair Housing and Local Equal
Opportunity Efforts. The 40 points for Fair Housing Effort
were awarded for "outstanding performance" in one of the
following areas:
1. "Providing housing choices for low- and moderate-
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income families in housing outside" of areas of
concentration; or
2. "implementation of a HUD-approved New Horizons Fair
Housing Assistance Project."
The 25 points for Local Equal Opportunity Efforts were
earned as follows:
1. 15 points could be earned for having awarded at
least 5% of the town's contracts within the last 2 years to
minority-owned businesses.
2. 10 points could be earned if the applicant had a
greater percentage of "minority, permanent, full-time
employees" than the percentage of minority population as a
whole in the county.
OSP
' s Approach
OSP's approach to scoring was similar to HUD's; in some
respects but significantly different in others. The
breakdown was as follows:
TABLE 4
OSP SCORING SYSTEM
RATING FACTOR PO iNT VALUE
Percent of household population
receiving human service assistance 50
Median family income 50
Project area need 100
Project impact 300
TOTAL 500
Community Needs
The first two factors were similar to the needs factors
HUD used. Although the specific data used was somewhat
different, the purpose was the sarae: to give preference to
those communities with the greatest need.
> Project Impact
The project impact criteria used by the state was very
similar to that used by HUD. Like hud, the state scored
impact by major categories; housing, public facilities and
economic development. The impact criteria used within each
category are nearly identical; there is no need to repeat
them here.
Project Need
The one major area of difference, an addition by the
New Hampshire program, is a category called Project Area
Need. This factor counts for a full 20 percent of the total
points to be awarded. This category specifically was de-
signed to allow the applications to be "compared to others
within the same category to determine the relative need of
each project area."(OSP, 1983b, p. 16)
Of course, HUD did not completely ignore the relative
needs of the project areas. It handled it, implicitly,
within the Project Impact section; you can make a greater
impact in an area with greater need. New Hampshire's
administrators decided, however, that they wanted each
applicant community to give very specific information on
project area need. They outlined what information they
wanted for each of the three categories in their Final
Rules
.
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in housing, the Final Rules asks the applicants to
write a narrative supplying
"specific information" in the
following areas:
extent of substandard and blighted housing
-eroHntr^ructureXijr^<™°—
cost of housing
income of area residents
lltl'S othT resources acrac,resrtne £g
vacancy ^^SiSSd'^^""-
extent of infrastructure problems
retail sales lag
unemployment rate in town and region
SP
capita
Pr°blemS SUCh 38 l0W e<2uali^d evaluation per
lack of other resources to address the problem
For public facilities grants, the state required a
statement showing:
a clear and current health and safety need
hnnH
r leV6lS
'
l0Cal e <3ual^ed tax rates and/orbo ding capacity require use of CDBG fundsthat there is not other funding available for state andfederal sources
Clearly, this "project area need" criteria provided the
state with data not requested or required by HUD. The type
of data, the majority able to be quantified, allowed the OSP
to easily compare application's specific needs. Since the
state made the decision to fund project-specific grants, the
addition of this scoring criteria allowed it to target its
grants in the area (not necessarily the community) with the
greatest demonstrable need. OSP used its flexibility in
scoring applications to advance its primary goal. This
caused a major redirection of the program.
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H. Priorities
As has been repeatedly demonstrated, OSP redesigned the
CDBG Program so that what was expected of applicants was
mnch clearer, and discretion in funding was reduced. Anoth-
er example of this was in the Final Statement section titled
"Overall Priorities," where specific projects priorities are
listed
.
This section begins by explaining why priorities were
developed
.
It can be expected that requests for CDBG fundswill far exceed the total amount available. Thelrmited resources of the CDBG Program require thesetting of program priorities so that the merits
p 3
apPllcatlons can be measured." (OSP, 1983a,
These priorities are given under four categories:
General (which apply to all grants); Housing; Economic
Development
; and Public Facilities. An outline of these
priorities here should be sufficient to give the reader a
flavor for the priorities.
General Priorities
1. "Those community development activities for which
existing public or private programs or sources of funds are
not otherwise available."
2. "Those projects and activities which present
innovative and transferable solutions to community
development problems."
3. "Those projects which are part of a long-range
community development strategy and conform to the
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municipality's master plan and ordinances."
Housing
1. "Those housing projects which have a neighborhood-
or community-wide impact and address health, safety and
energy conservation efforts."
2. "Those housing projects which would not adversely
impact existing residents either through displacement or
significant increase in housing costs."
Economic Development
1. "Those economic development projects which would
provide competitive wages and salaries and create permanent
rather than temporary jobs."
2. "Those economic development projects which provide
for the reuse of program funds."
Public Facilities
1. "Those public facilities projects which would
complement and promote housing and economic development
improvements .
"
2. "Those public facilities projects which would
eliminate clear and current threats to public health and
welfare ..."
Many of these same themes show up repeatedly throughout
the state's literature. Both the Governor's staff and the
people at the Office of State Planning who drafted the
actual program design had very clear ideas of what they
wanted to accomplish with this program, and they said so
very clearly in the Final Statement.
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I. Administration
Under the section in the Final Statement discussing
"Administrative Requirements" the changes anticipated from
the program as administered by HUD was described as follows:
minor changes in the selection process,the new Feasibility Grant Program
additional technical assistance to bothprospective applicants and grant recipients
more emphasis on enforcement of state
environmental laws,
stronger coordination for recipients with state
agencies ^
COmmunity development and housing
and an> increase in the number of municipalities
receiving grants each year. (OSP, 1983a, p. 11)
One other important change was the establishment of a
nine-member Community Development Advisory Committee, which
was designed to do two things: First, any recommendations
made by the staff of OSP regarding rules or grantees would
need final approval of the Advisory Committee; and second,
any community who felt that it was not fairly treated,
either regarding an application or an administrative matter,
could appeal to the committee, who had the authority to
overrule any decision of the staff. This was designed to
put final decisions in the hands of an objective outside
group. Appendix E of HUD RPS states that "since the Small
Cities Program is a discretionary program, the decision of
the HUD Area Office will be Final." New Hampshire was
determined to try a different approach.
This Advisory Committee was composed of a number of
people who were involved in development activities around
the state, as well as gubernatorial appointees. The commit-
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tee was to include the Director of the Office of State
Planning (who was to act as chairman), the Director of the
Division of Economic Development at the state Department of
Resources and Economic Development, the Executive Director
of the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, and six
public members (at least 3 of which were to be "municipal
officials") who were to be appointed by the governor.
Next, it is time to look at the data on the grants
applied for and awarded in NH, both under HUD and OSP. An
analysis of this data will uncover whether the state was
successful in implementing the major changes which the state
envisioned when it decided to administer the program.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
A. General
An analysis of the data on the sixteen years' worth of
grants under consideration do show a program in a great
state of change. Not all of these changes can be attributed
to the devolution. Some have been attributable to changing
Presidential administrations, some to a changing economic
picture, and some to changes in local needs. But certainly,
in nearly every aspect of the program that can be studied,
the effect of the devolution on this program is striking.
It is not within the scope of this essay to study all
of the changes, its expressed purpose is to determine wheth-
er devolution moved communities toward the goal of better
achieving the three broad national objectives found in the
original Congressional legislation. 9 There are many dif-
ferent aspects of this program that must be analyzed to
determine how successful devolution was. In this section,
as many as it was possible to obtain data on will be dis-
cussed. Before beginning the detailed analysis, it may be
useful to summarize the various areas to be analyzed and to
discuss what would suggest a change in each area, and why.
There are a number of items which, if kept in mind,
will help the reader understand the data more quickly.
Reminder, these were: 1. Benefit to low- and moderate-
income families; 2. prevention or elimination of slums or
blight; and 3. elimination of conditions which pose a
serious threat to the health or welfare of the community.
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First, it is iroportant to remember that there were a number
of administrative changes in the federal government during
the period this data covers.
1975
- 1976 Program as originally authorized under Presi-
dent Ford.
1977
- 1980 Program as administered and then re-authorized
under President Carter.
1981
- 1982 Program as administered under President Reagan.
1983
- 1990 Program as administered by the New Hampshire
Office of State Planning.
Although the main focus of this study is the significant
differences between the 1975 - 1982 and the 1983 - l 990
periods, it is often helpful to note the differences the
various national administrations made to the program.
The following "Chart of General Information" is a two
page summary of the data. in each category (explained
below) and for each agency the following is included:
Number of applications; the number of applicants who
received funding; and the percentage of applicants who
received funds ( REC/REQ )
. Following is a brief explanation
of each category.
All Applications
This section summarizes all of the applications received by
HUD or OSP during the years 1975 - 1990. This data shows
that OSP has funded a significantly higher percentage of
applicants than HUD.
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Population Breakdown
This section shows how various sizes of municipalities
fared under HUD and OSP. This indicates not Qnly ^ ^
funded a significantly greater percentage in every category,
but also that in categories under population 10,000, the
differences range from 35 - 72%.
Population: Big v. Small
This section breaks the municipalities down into those
over 10,000 and those under 10,000 in population,
essentially summarizing the Population Breakdown section
above. This clearly indicates that although OSP funded more
applications generally, the greatest difference was in those
municipalities with populations under 10,000. This also
indicates that a significantly greater number of small towns
applied for grants to OSP.
Counties
This section summarizes the data in a way that
illustrates the statewide geographical distribution of the
grants
.
Activities
This section relates to the type of activity being
funded. In the HUD section, the requested column is blank
because data on activities for non-funded activities is not
kept by HUD. Therefore, because comparisons are not possi-
ble, no percentages have been generated.
By Years
This section is set up with a year by year summary.
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TABLE 5
CHART OF GENERAL INFORMATION
ALL APPLICATIONS
POPULATION BREAKDOWN
0
1,001 -
2,501 -
5,001 -
7,501 -
10,001 -
15,000 -
1, 000
2,500
5, 000
7,500
10,000
15, 000
POPULATION:
Big vs. Small
Up to 10,000
Over 10,000
COUNTIES
Belknap
Carrol
Cheshire
Coos
Grafton
Hillsborough
Merrimack
Stratford
Sullivan
Rockingham
ACTIVITIES
Housing Rehabilitation
Public Facilities
Economic Development
Comprehensive
BY YEARS
HUD OSP
75 83
76 84
77 85
78 86
79 87
80 88
81 89
82 90
REQ
178
10
22
34
13
14
45
40
HUD
REC
88
1
7
8
3
6
33
30
49
10
32
26
23
43
73
75
REQ
211
28
46
49
23
5
36
24
OSP
REC
161
23
31
36
18
4
28
21
76
82
67
73
78
80
78
88
93 25 27 151 112 74
85 63 74 60 49 82
12 5 42 11 9 82
1 3 43 12 8 67
9 7 78 21 15 71
23 11 48 29 26 90
23 7 30
• 42 33 79
27 14 52 11 6 55
23 11 48 25 22 88
14 8 57 16 13 81
12 8 67 28 22 79
28 14 50 16 7 43
na 36 98 82
na 20 69 50
na 3 28 23
na 29 16 6
44 12 27 18 18 100
23 9 39 39 27 69
17 10 59 33 24 73
26 9 35 28 24 86
18 11 61 25 22 88
15 12 80 26 13 50
23 13 57 26 19 73
12 12 100 16 15 94
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B. Participation
One of the goals of the devolution was to allow the
funds to be distributed according to the priorities of the
states. Since one of the biggest complaints that the states
had against HUD
•
s administration was that the funds repeat-
edly went to the same communities, it is only natural that
wider disbursal of the funds would be an objective of the
state's program design. N.H. included the goal of increased
participation in their anticipated changes.
There were two main barriers to increasing participa-
tion. First, there was only so much money to go around.
Second, most of the smaller communities did not have the
administrative capacity to handle either the grant-writing
or the administration. The state dealt with these
difficulties in very straight-forward ways.
C. Funding Limits
The problem of limited funds is one that New Hampshire
had no control over. Allocations were set by Washington and
fluctuated based on the political situation in Washington.
The state, having made the decision to disburse the funds
more widely, made the only decision possible to implement
such a goal: it reduced the amount of funds that each grant
recipient could receive and put limits on how much munici-
palities could spend on certain projects.
The limit on the amount of funding per grant was sig-
nificant. In 1982, HUD had a per grant ceiling of $500,000
with a total allocation of funds to the program of $5.7
72
million dollars. Over S3 million of this was earmarked for
multi-year grants which had already been approved.
In contrast, New Hampshire set a $400,000 limit on
grants in 1983 .*> This was even thQugh thgy ^ g
allocation of $6,015,000 and had multi-year commitments
(left over from HUD) of under $2 million.
Of course, not every grant awarded was for the maximum
amount. But, as the table below shows, after the first 4
years of the program, HUD averaged between $370,000 and
$450,000, whereas OSP (after their first year) averaged
between $250,000 and $325,000, generally under $300,000.
TABLE 6
ANNUAL AVERAGE GRANT AWARDS
HUD AVE GRANT osp AVE GRA[JT
76 Al'Wl 83 359, 272
11 ut',lll It
^0,148
79 370'^4 86 ""I"'
80 ' 87 237 ' 80 °376,500 88 323i89581 407,577 89 298 913
82 468,250 90
D. Administrative Capacity
Secondly, there was the question of the smaller
communities ability to apply for, and administer, CDBG
grants. Although under HUD there was supposedly a
presumption of capacity, in reality the application process,
This has changed somewhat over the years. From 1984 to
1988 this was reduced to $350,000. In 1989, this was
changed to allow communities with populations of over 20,000
to apply for up to $500,000.
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which included the requireraent for a Housing Assistance
Program (HAP) was so complicated as fcQ^ ^
small towns.
in addition, HUD s apparent tendency to award the
grants to the same, larger, communities made it difficult
for towns to engage consultants. The risk was too great for
the consultants (whether private or regional planning
agencies) to undertake the project with the understanding
they would receive payment upon receiving funding. And, from
the town's point of view the expectation of success was too
small to justify "fronting" the money for an application.
OSP's staff made two changes, both discussed earlier,
to help these communities. First, they made a decision to
provide technical assistance to the towns, "both to
prospective applicants and grant recipients," This
assistance allowed towns with pressing needs to get involved
with the program without committing any of its own funds.
OSP fulfilled this technical assistance obligation in two
ways. At first, the staff helped communities with no prior
experience prepare grants. This created two problems: 1)
staff time was limited; and 2) staff found itself required
to score grants which it had helped prepare against those it
hadn't, a potential, if not certain, conflict of interest.
They resolved this problem in a way that had actually been
foreseen: they provided money to the state's regional plan-
ning agencies specifically to provide technical assistance
in preparing grants.
second, OSP implemented the Feasibility Grant program.
These grants were small <„ot to exceed ^
structured to allow them to be used to prepare a regular
CDBG application. $ i 20 ,000 was set aside by the state to
fund these grants in 1983.
The results of the state's attempt to increase partici-
pation were significant, as the chart below clearly shows.
TABLE 7
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION SUMMARY:
OVERALL GRANT PROGRAMS
APPLICATIONS GRANTS
Total Different Total Different
HUD i7o
Communities Communities
OSP 011 2 88 28Ub 211 78 161 59
Under HUD, 50% (88 of 178) of the applications received
were funded and an even smaller percentage, 45% (28 of 62),
of the communities which requested funds over the 8 years
ever received funding. OSP, in contrast, funded 76% (78 of
211) of the greater number of applications it received, and
funded 76% (59 of 78) of the communities that applied.
Since there are 229 non-entitlement communities in New
Hampshire, HUD had distributed funds to 12% of the eligible
communities; OSP, in its first 8 years, had done projects in
over 25% of possible communities. As this discussion has
begun to address, not only were the funds spread around
more, they were made available to smaller communities. That
will be discussed in greater detail next.
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E. Distribution to Smaller Towns
The following table quickly makes it evident that the
OSP's efforts (discussed above) to increase participation by
smaller towns was extremely successful.
TABLE 8
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION SUMMARY:
BY POPULATION
FISCAL YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
HUD TOTALS
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
POP <= 10, 000 POP > 10,000
REQ REC % REQ REC %
32 5 16 12 7 5813 Z 15 10 7 70
5 1 15 12 9 75
16 2 13 10 7 70
7 3 43 11 8 73
5 3 60 10 9 90
11 5 45 12 8 67
4 4 100 8 8 100
93 25 27 85 63 74
11 11 100 7 7 100
26 16 62 14 11 79
19 15 80 14 9 64
20 17 85 8 7 88
17 15 88 7 6 86
23 9 39 5 4 80
20 15 68 4 4 100
13 12 92 3 3 100
149 110 75 62 51 82
OSP TOTALS
From 1975 to 1982, HUD received 92 applications from
communities of 10,000 or fewer people; it funded 25 (27%) of
those applications. In contrast HUD, during an eight-year
period, funded 74% of the applications it received from
communities over 10,000. OSP, from 1983 to 1990, funded 75%
of the applications it received from communities with 10,000
or fewer people; 82% of those over 10,000 population.
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This initial breakdown is intriguing, but going into
greater depth, and looking at the populations of the various
towns which applied and which received funding, reveals over
and over the differences in this area between HUD and OSP.
The following table breaks down the data even further. This
table shows the percentage of grants awarded to communities
in each of the listed population categories.
TABLE 9
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION SUMMARY:
ANNUALLY BY POPULATION
Figures are percentages of total grants funded each year
Year 0 - 5000 5001 - 10000 10001 - 15000 15001 - 50000
1975 16
1976 0
1977 0
1978 20
1979 27
1980 16
1981 43
1982 25
1983 47
1984 41
1985 39
1986 56
1987 68
1988 57
1989 65
1990 74
Even a cursory review of this data shows that the OSP
immediately altered the direction of the CDBG program. The
changes made in New Hampshire even overshadow those made by
the Reagan administration's dramatic changes.
Clearly, under Carter, the program overwhelmingly
favored medium-sized cities. This was a direction result of
24 32 24
22 33 44
10 50 40
10 30 40
9 18 45
8 48 24
0 36 21
8 33 33
18 29 12
23 28 19
25 26 13
12 24 8
0 18 14
7 14 21
15 0 20
7 7 14
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its "targeting" strategy. Reagan's attempts to decentralize
priorities allowed more input from the state, and the
results reflected a shift toward more specific projects in
smaller communities. This shows up clearly i„ the 1981 and
1982 results.
But the shift after 1983, the year the state took over
the program's administration, is dramatic. The small towns
were clearly reaping the benefits of the devolution. The
following shows, year by year, the amount of funding
received by those communities which applied for funding. By
sorting the data using an ascending order for the population
column, it becomes immediately evident for each year whether
the funded communities tended to be larger or smaller.
TABLE 10
GRANT APPLICATIONS:
ANNUALLY BY POPULATION
AGENCY FY TOWN POP FUNDSREC
HUD 75 BROOKFIELD 400 0HUD 75 BRIDGWATER 600 0HUD 75 SALISBURY 1000 0HUD 75 WOODSTOCK 1000 282000
HUD 75 DEERING 1000 0
HUD 75 MONTVERNON 1500 0
HUD 75 TAMWORTH 1700 0
HUD 75 ASHLAND 1800 0
HUD 75 WARNER 2000 175000
HUD 75 ROLLNGSFRD 2400 0
HUD 75 ALTON 2400 0
HUD 75 NRTHUMBRLD 2500 0
HUD 75 WILTON 2700 0
HUD 75 WEARE 3300 0
HUD 75 BOSCAWEN 3400 0
HUD 75 HAVERHILL 3400 0
HUD 75 LANCASTER 3400 0
continued next page
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Table 10 continued
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 75
HUD 7 5
HUD 75
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 5
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 7 5
HUD 7 6
HUD 7 6
EPPING
HOPKINTON
LITCHFIELD
MEREDITH
NEWMARKET
FARMINGTON
GILFORD
PETERBORO
PLYMOUTH
RAYMOND
NEWPORT
FRANKLIN
PELHAM
MILFORD
BEDFORD
SOMERSWRTH
DURHAM
EXETER
LEBANON
GOFFSTOWN
BERLIN
MERRIMACK
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
HUD 75 SALEM
CONCORD
WOODSTOCK
NRTHUMBRLD
HUD 7 6 HENNIKER
HUD 7 6 GORHAM
HUD 7 6 LANCASTER
HUD 7 6 EPPING
HUD 7 6 CHARLESTWN
HUD 7 6 COLEBROOK
HUD 7 6 GILFORD
HUD 7 6 PLYMOUTH
HUD 7 6 NEWPORT
HUD 7 6 HOOKSETT
HUD 7 6 PELHAM
HUD 7 6 SOMERSWRTH
HUD 7 6 EXETER
HUD 7 6 LEBANON
HUD 7 6 BERLIN
HUD 7 6 CLAREMONT
HUD 7 6 MERRIMACK
HUD 7 6 DERRY
HUD 7 6 KEENE
jjUU 0} n n noo 0
A o r\ s\4Z00 0
A o r\ r\
0
a inn
ft J U U 0
4600 0
ft o u u 0
A Q n nft y U U 0
5100 0
J JUU 0C o r\ r\D o 0 0 137000
7 Q n n/ j u u 0
o 1 00 7000
ft 7 n n 9200
0
10400
-L. v/ " \J \J 191000
1 Ofinnx u o u u 0
x x u u u 40000
11200 0
11300 55000
13000 20000
15500 24800
1 5finnX ~J \J \J \J 0
i ft q nn 0
t. X D U U 50000
9 4 o n nz ft z u u 37000
J U ft u u 0
1UUU 0
ocnnz o u u 0
J z u u 0
J jUU 0
^ 4 n n 0
J ouu 0
0
4500 0
4ftnnt o u u 0
r i n nJ 1UU 0
6100W _y w w O o c n n nZ Z o U U 0
7 ^nn/ -J u u n0
8100 i nnnn1 u u u u
10400 X ft u u u u
11000 Z ft o u u u
11200 0
13000 130000
14500 0
15500 53000
18900 86000
21500 350000
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Table 10 continued
HUD 7fi OTVTGnur
HUD il S
ALEM 24 200 5900076 CONCORD 30400 q
HUD 7 7
WOODSTOCK 1QQ0 0
HUD 7 7
NRTHUMBRLD 2500 q
Hud in COLEBROOK 4500 q
HUD SSST 6300
HUD 7-7 PELHAM 8100 13Q00
HUD 77
SOMERSWRTH 10400 255000
Hun 77 EXETER 11000 ^
HUD 77
LEBANON 11200 i 90 000
hud tziil
0m iSSSSS
Hnn 77
BERLIN 13000 312500
HUD Vn
CLAREMONT 14500 250000
HUD 77
DERRY 18900 0
SnD 77 KEENE 21500 119500
HUD 77
SALEM 24 200 7300077 CONCORD 30400 62000
HUD 7 8 NEWDURHAM 1200 0HUD 7 8 ASHLAND 1800 0
Hun 7«
ASHLAND 1800 0UD 78 DEERFIELD 2000 0HUD 78 MILTON 2500 0HUD 78 NRTHUMBRLD 2500 n
HUD 78 OSSIPEE 2500 0HUD 78 PITTSFIELD 2900 0HUD 78 HAVERHILL 3400
HUD 7 8 LANCASTER 3400
HUD 7 8 WOLFEBORO 4000
HUD 7 8 MEREDITH
HUD 7 8 RAYMOND 5500
HUD 78 HOOKSETT 7300
HUD 78 PELHAM 8100
HUD 7 8 BEDFORD 9500
HUD 7 8 SOMERSWRTH 10400
HUD 78 DURHAM 10600
HUD 78 EXETER 11000 0
HUD 78 LEBANON 11200 0
HUD 78 BERLIN 13000 300000
HUD 78 CLAREMONT 14500 400000
HUD 78 MERRIMACK 15500 350000
HUD 78 LACONIA 15600 500000
HUD 78 KEENE 21500 300000
HUD 78 CONCORD 30400 349000
HUD 7 9 STRATFORD 1000 0
continued next page
0
174250
0
4700 0
0
0
78000
0
350000
0
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Table 10 continued
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
NRTHUMBRLD
OSSIPEE
PITTSFIELD
RAYMOND
FRANKLIN
BEDFORD
SOMERSWRTH
EXETER
LEBANON
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
MERRIMACK
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
SALEM
CONCORD
WOODSTOCK
OSSIPEE
NEWMARKET
RAYMOND
LITTLETON
SOMERSWRTH
EXETER
LEBANON
GOFFSTOWN
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
CONCORD
STRATFORD
WHITEFIELD
OSSIPEE
WILTON
PITTSFIELD
LANCASTER
NEWMARKET
LITTLETON
FRANKLIN
AMHERST
MILFORD
SOMERSWRTH
EXETER
LEBANON
GOFFSTOWN
2500
2500
2900
5500
7900
9500
10400
11000
11200
13000
14500
15500
15600
18900
21500
24200
30400
1000
2500
4300
5500
5600
10400
11000
11200
11300
13000
14500
15600
18900
21500
30400
1000
1700
2500
2700
2900
3400
4300
5600
7900
8300
8700
10400
11000
11200
11300
178500
391373
320663
0
0
0
500000
0
0
600000
400000
0
400000
548000
281500
100000
351000
0
400000
400000
0
400000
350000
364000
400000
304000
300000
400000
300000
400000
0
500000
275000
500000
120000
300000
0
600000
0
0
0
0
505000
0
400000
534000
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Table 10 continued
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
81
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
CLAREMONT
MERRIMACK
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
CONCORD
LISBON
PITTSFIELD
WINCHESTER
FRANKLIN
SOMERSWRTH
LEBANON
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
CONCORD
WOODSTOCK
NRTHUMBRLD
PITTSFIELD
WINCHESTER
EPPING
HINSDALE
FARMINGTON
PEMBROKE
NEWPORT
CONWAY
FRANKLIN
SOMERSWRTH
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
CLAREMONT
LACONIA
CONCORD
CROYDON
WHITEFIELD
TROY
MARLBORO
ALTON
OSSIPEE
CANAAN
WILTON
AUBURN
13000
14500
14500
15500
15600
18900
21500
30400
1500
2900
3500
7900
10400
11200
13000
14500
15600
18900
21500
30400
1000
2500
2900
3500
3500
3700
4600
4900
6300
7200
7900
10400
13000
14500
14500
15600
30400
460
1700
1800
1850
2400
2500
2500
2700
2900
600000
351500
0
0
500000
163000
0
450000
304000
455000
365000
500000
600000
400000
500000
500000
600000
335000
460000
600000
400000
400000
351000
325904
400000
400000
355000
400000
380000
265000
345000
395000
400000
355000
45000
400000
450000
0
130361
0
0
0
297500
200000
350000
0
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Table 10 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
HAVERHILL 34 on
HILLSBORO 3 S nn
WINCHESTER 3 5 o n
EPPING 35 on
HINSDALE 37 00
WOLFBORO 40 00
CHARLESTWN 45 00
FARMINGTON 46 00
PEMBROKE 49 00
PLYMOUTH 51 00
SWANZEY 52 00
RAYMOND 55 00
RAYMOND 55 00
LITTLETON 56 00
NEWPORT 63 00
CONWAY 72 00
FRANKLIN 79 00
SOMERSWRTH 104 00
LEBANON 112 00
BERLIN 130 00
BERLIN 130 00
LONDONDRRY 136 00
HUDSON 140 00
CLAREMONT 145 00
145 00
LACONIA 156 00
DERRY 189 00
KEENE 215 00
KEENE 215 00
CONCORD 304 00
LANDAFF 3 00
DALTON 7 00
LEMPSTER 7 00
BETHLEHEM 18 00
TROY 21 00
WAKEFIELD 22 50
SUNAPEE 23 00
PITTSFIELD 29 00
WOLFEBORO 40 00
MEREDITH 42 00
NEWMARKET 43 00
COLEBROOK 45 00
PLYMOUTH 51 00
RAYMOND 55 00
NEWPORT 63 00
CONWAY 72 00
FRANKLIN 79 00
LISBON 87 00
239500
0
336000
240000
325000
0
227950
190000
67683
0
0
166456
0
71000
113500
294500
350000
500000
154350
215000
285000
0
0
323000
177000
291800
0
63400
160000
500000
350000
350000
287500
230000
217000
0
131500
0
300000
0
284660
350000
270000
276000
239000
16600
0
350000
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Table 10 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86
87
87
87
87
87
MILFORD
SOMERSWRTH
SOMERSWRTH
LEBANON
LEBANON
GOFFSTOWN
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
CLAREMONT
LACONIA
DERRY
KEENE
CANAAN
CONCORD
WARNER
DALTON
CARROLL
TAMWORTH
BETHLEHEM
ASHLAND
ASHLAND
GREENVILLE
NORTHWOOD
NRTHUMBRLD
CANAAN
HENNIKER
WALPOLE
WINCHESTER
CHARLESTWN
FARMINGTON
HINSDALE
PLYMOUTH
LITTLETON
NEWPORT
SOMERSWRTH
SOMERSWRTH
LEBANON
GOFFSTOWN
BERLIN
CLAREMONT
LACONIA
KEENE
DORCHESTER
DALTON
MIDDLETON
PITTSBURG
STWARTSTWN
8700
10400
10400
11200
11200
11300
13000
14500
14500
15600
18900
21500
25001
30400
200
700
700
1700
1800
1800
1800
2000
2200
2500
2500
3200
3200
3500
4400
4600
4700
5100
5600
6300
10400
10400
11200
11300
13000
14500
15600
21500
300
700
800
800
1000
350000
162250
0
200000
0
0
125100
281000
70640
500000
0
0
178000
450000
316250
144600
0
190000
200000
334100
334100
206000
16000
350000
172000
300000
0
234300
0
200000
223100
175000
286000
286000
200000
217250
109250
182000
874900
0
500000
275000
176400
129600
196000
300000
350000
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Table 10 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
87
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
WOODSTOCK 1 n n n
LISBON
1 son
WHITEFIELD 1 7 n o
WARNER 2000
ANTRIM 2200
MILTON 2500
HENNIKER 3200
GORHAM 3300
HAVERHILL 3400
WINCHESTER 3500
EPPING 3500
CHARLESTWN 4500
FARMINGTON 4600
SOMERSWRTH 10400
BERT, TNT 13000
CLAREMONT 14500
CLAREMONT 14500
LACONIA 15600
KEENE 21500
CONCORD 30400
LYMAN 300
COLUMBIA 700
MIDDLETON 800
BATH 800
MADISON 1100
UNITY 1100
LINCOLN 1400
LISBON 1500
GREENVILLE 2000
WARNER 2000
NORTHWOOD 2200
BRISTOL 2200
OSSIPEE 2500
CANAAN 2500
NORTHFIELD 3100
HILLSBORO 3500
EPPING 3500
WINCHESTER 3500
HINSDALE 3700
COLEBROOK 4500
LITTLETON 5600
NEWPORT 6300
SOMERSWRTH 10400
CLAREMONT 14500
LACONIA 15600
KEENE 21500
CONCORD 30400
300000
117600
286200
155000
300000
130000
0
258500
300000
326000
0
183000
292500
0
188000
265800
150000
348000
195000
284000
0
250000
0
26450
300000
0
0
232400
0
250000
0
0
0
0
350000
0
0
350000
0
350000
350000
0
319792
0
361000
500000
221000
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Table 10 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
LYMAN
WARREN
GRAFTON
BATH
STEWRTSTWN
CAMPTON
WHITEFIELD
WARNER
GREENVILLE
BRISTOL
OSSIPEE
PITTSFIELD
NEWTON
GORHAM
HAVERHILL
TILTON
RAYMOND
LITTLETON
NEWPORT
CONWAY
LACONIA
KEENE
CONCORD
CONCORD
CLARKSVILL
STARK
WENTWORTH
COLUMBIA
GRAFTON
UNITY
WHITEFIELD
WARNER
CANAAN
HAVERHILL
TILTON
COLEBROOK
NEWPORT
SOMERSWRTH
CONCORD
300
700
800
800
1000
1700
1700
2000
2000
2200
2500
2900
3100
3300
3400
3400
5500
5600
6300
7200
15600
21500
30400
30400
300
500
600
700
800
1100
1700
2000
2500
3400
3400
4500
6300
10400
30400
350000
350000
350000
215000
335000
0
250000
350000
350000
0
350000
350000
0
0
350000
350000
212900
150000
300000
0
396450
200000
345000
125000
296000
350000
350000
350000
0
24000
350000
168200
350000
350000
500000
225000
350000
825000
122000
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F. Geographic Distribution
Next, an analysis of the geographic distribution of
^ant aPP l ications and awards is ^^ ^
tables provide information on appl ications and awards fog
each of the 10 New Hampshire counties.
TABLE 11
GRANT APPLICATIONS:
ANNUALLY BY COUNTY
TOWN popr Y
Hun / b
Hnn / D
Hnn / b
HUD 75
HUD 76
HUD i i
HUD 7 ft/ o
HUD 7 ft/ o
HUD 7 Q
HUD 80
HUD 81
HUD 82
OSP 83
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 86
OSP 87
OSP 88
OSP 89
OSP 89
OSP 90
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 78
HUD 78
HUD 79
HUD 80
HUD 81
OSP 83
OSP 84
FUNDSREC COUNTY
ALTON
GILFORD
LACONIA
MEREDITH
GILFORD
LACONIA
LACONIA
MEREDITH
LACONIA
LACONIA
LACONIA
LACONIA
LACONIA
LACONIA
ALTON
LACONIA
MEREDITH
LACONIA
LACONIA
LACONIA
TILTON
LACONIA
TILTON
BROOKFIELD
TAMWORTH
OSSIPEE
WOLFEBORO
OSSIPEE
OSSIPEE
OSSIPEE
CONWAY
CONWAY
2400 0 BEL
4800 0 BEL
15600 o DILL}
4200 o DHL
4800 o RTTT
15600 o DCjLi
15600 500000 RFT,
4700 0 BEL
15600 400000 BEL
15600 300000 BEL
15600 500000 BEL
15600 600000 BEL
15600 400000 BEL
15600 291800 BEL
2400 0 BEL
15600 500000 BEL
4200 0 BEL
15600 500000 BEL
15600 348000 BEL
15600 361000 BEL
3400 350000 BEL
15600 396450 BEL
3400 500000 BEL
400 0 CAR
1700 0 CAR
2500 0 CAR
4000 0 CAR
2500 391373 CAR
2500 400000 CAR
2500 500000 CAR
7200 265000 CAR
7200 294500 CAR
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Table 11 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
84
84
85
85
85
86
88
88
89
89
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
82
83
83
84
84
84
84
84
84
84
85
85
86
86
86
86
87
87
88
88
88
89
75
75
75
76
76
76
76
OSSIPEE
WOLFBORO
CONWAY
WOLFEBORO
WAKEFIELD
TAMWORTH
MADISON
OSSIPEE
OSSIPEE
CONWAY
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
KEENE
WINCHESTER
HINSDALE
WINCHESTER
HINSDALE
KEENE
WINCHESTER
KEENE
MARLBORO
TROY
SWANZEY
TROY
KEENE
HINSDALE
KEENE
WINCHESTER
WALPOLE
KEENE
WINCHESTER
KEENE
WINCHESTER
HINSDALE
KEENE
BERLIN
LANCASTER
NRTHUMBRLD
BERLIN
COLEBROOK
GORHAM
LANCASTER
2500
4000
7200
4000
2250
1700
1100
2500
2500
7200
21500
21500
21500
21500
21500
21500
21500
21500
3500
3700
3500
3700
21500
3500
21500
1850
1800
5200
2100
21500
4700
21500
3500
3200
21500
3500
21500
3500
3700
21500
13000
3400
2500
13000
4500
3300
3400
297500
0
16600
300000
0
190000
300000
0
350000
0
50000
350000
119500
300000
281500
0
0
460000
365000
400000
325904
325000
160000
336000
63400
0
0
0
217000
0
223100
275000
234300
0
195000
326000
500000
350000
0
200000
20000
0
0
130000
0
0
0
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CAR
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
CHE
COO
coo
coo
coo
coo
coo
coo
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Table 11 continued
HUD 77 BERlTRL° 2500 ° COOHUD 77 COLEBROOK 1 f 9 ° 2 312500 COOHUD 7-7 LU 4500 0 TOO
HUD BERlT
RLD
,l
5 °° ° ™
HUD 7ft
ERLIN i 300 0 300000 COO
HUD 7« LANCASTER 3400 174250 COO
HUD BERLIN^ ,1*°° ° cSS
HUD 7Q 2S
LIN 13000 600000 COO
HUD 7Q NRTHUMBRLD 2500 17 8500 COO
HUD B^IN°
RD
,122° ° COO
HUD 81 BERt'tn
300000 C0°
HUD ftT
LIN 13000 600000 COO
HUD
LANCASTER 3400 0 COO
HUD «i
STRATFORD 1000 0 COO
HUD ft9
WHITEFIELD 1700 275000 COO
SsP 83 ^
RLIN 13000 500000 COO
OSP 83
B
^LIN 13000 400000 COO
Osp 11
NRTHUMBRLD 2500 400000 COO
oil It
™N 13000 215000 coo
oil 84 o^
RLIN 13000 215000 COO
BERLIN 13000 285000 COO
Osp It
WHITEFIELD 1700 130361 COO
OSP 8S n^ IN 13000 125100 COO
°cp H BERLIN 13000 125100 COO
H COLEBROOK 4500 350000 COO
°op H DALTON 700 350000 COO°SP 86 BERLIN 13000 874900 COOOSP 86 DALTON 700 144600 COOOSP 86 NRTHUMBRLD 2500 350000 COOOSP 8 6 CARROLL 7 00 0 COOosp 87 BERLIN 13000
osp 87 DALTON 700
osp 87 GORHAM 3300
0SP 87 PITTSBURG 800 3000000SP 87 STWARTSTWN 1000 350000
0SP 87 WHITEFIELD 1700 286200
0SP 88 COLUMBIA 700 250000
osp 88 COLEBROOK 4500 350000
osp 89 WHITEFIELD 1700 250000
osp 89 STEWRTSTWN 1000 335000
°SP 89 GORHAM 3300 0 COO
osp 90 WHITEFIELD 1700 350000 COO
osp 90 COLEBROOK 4500 225000 COO
°SP 90 CLARKSVILL 300 296000 COO
HUD 7 5 ASHLAND 1800 0 GRA
HUD 75 BRIDGWATER 600 0 GRA
HUD 75 HAVERHILL 3400 0 GRA
HUD 75 LEBANON 11200 0 GRA
188000 COO
129600 COO
258500 COO
COO
COO
COO
COO
COO
COO
COO
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Table 11 continued
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 76
HUD 76
HUD 76
HUD 77
HUD 77
HUD 78
HUD 78
HUD 78
HUD 78
HUD 79
HUD 80
HUD 80
HUD 80
HUD 81
HUD 81
HUD 82
HUD 82
OSP 83
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 85
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 86
OSP 87
OSP 87
OSP 87
OSP 87
OSP 88
OSP 88
OSP 88
OSP 88
OSP 88
OSP 88
PLYMOUTH
WOODSTOCK
LEBANON
PLYMOUTH
WOODSTOCK
LEBANON
WOODSTOCK
ASHLAND
ASHLAND
HAVERHILL
LEBANON
LEBANON
LITTLETON
LEBANON
WOODSTOCK
LEBANON
LITTLETON
LEBANON
LISBON
WOODSTOCK
CANAAN
HAVERHILL
LEBANON
LITTLETON
PLYMOUTH
BETHLEHEM
CANAAN
LANDAFF
LEBANON
LISBON
PLYMOUTH
LEBANON
ASHLAND
ASHLAND
BETHLEHEM
CANAAN
LEBANON
LITTLETON
PLYMOUTH
DORCHESTER
HAVERHILL
LISBON
WOODSTOCK
LISBON
LINCOLN
LYMAN
BATH
CANAAN
BRISTOL
5100 0 GRA
1000 282000 GRA
11200 0 GRA
5100 0 GRA
1000 0 GRA
1 1 OAA1 IzOO 190000 GRA
1 A f\ r\1000 0 GRA
1 o r\ f\1800 0 GRA
loUU 0 GRA
~i A n n
-5 4 U U 0 GRA
l i 9 n n 0 GRA
1 1 o n n1 1 z u u 0 GRA
JDUU 400000 GRA
1 i o a nX 1 z u u 400000 GRA
i n n n1UUU 0 GRA
1 1 z U U 400000 GRA
O 0 (J u 0 GRA
1 IzOO 400000 GRA
1 c n r\1 3 U U 304000 GRA
1000 400000 GRA
2500 200000 GRA
3400 239500 GRA
11200 154350 GRA
5600 71000 GRA
5100 0 GRA
1 O A A1800 230000 GRA
o c n a azbOOO 178000 GRA
O A A300 350000 GRA
I lonn
I I z U U 200000 GRA
o / U U 350000 GRA
oiuu 270000 GRA
1 1 o A n± ± z u u 0 GRA
1 onnloUU O O A 1 A A3 J4 100 GRA
i ft a nloUU TT/ T A Aoi4100 GRA
i ft n nloUU A A A A A AzuOOOO GRA
z o u u 172000 GRA
I i innI I z u u 1 A A A IT A109250 GRA
JDUU "1 A /* A A A286000 GRA
OIUU 1 *~7 C A A A175000 GRA
"3 n njUU 176400 GRA
3 4 U U O A A A f\ f\300000 GRA
i cnn 117600 GRA
t n f\1000 300000 GRA
1500 232400 GRA
1400 0 GRA
300 0 GRA
800 26450 GRA
2500 0 GRA
2200 0 GRA
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Table 11 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
90
90
90
90
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
76
76
77
77
77
78
78
78
79
79
80
81
81
81
81
81
84
84
84
85
85
86
86
87
88
LITTLETON
HAVERHILL
GRAFTON
WARREN
LYMAN
BATH
BRISTOL
CAMPTON
WENTWORTH
CANAAN
GRAFTON
HAVERHILL
DEERING
LITCHFIELD
MONTVERNON
PETERBORO
WEARE
WILTON
BEFORD
GOFFSTOWN
MERRIMACK
MILFORD
PELHAM
MERRIMACK
PELHAM
GOFFSTOWN
MERRIMACK
PELHAM
BEDFORD
MERRIMACK
PELHAM
BEDFORD
MERRIMACK
GOFFSTOWN
AMHERST
GOFFSTOWN
MERRIMACK
MILFORD
WILTON
WILTON
HILLSBORO
HUDSON
MILFORD
GOFFSTOWN
GREENVILLE
GOFFSTOWN
ANTRIM
GREENVILLE
5600
3400
800
700
300
800
2200
1700
600
2500
800
3400
150000
350000
350000
350000
350000
215000
0
0
350000
350000
0
350000
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
1000 n UTT
4200 o UTTn X L>
1500 o UTTn i j_i
4900 o T-i TT
3300 o UTTniij
2700 o HTT
9500 0 HIL
11300 55000 HIL
15500 24800 HIL
8700 9200 HIL
8100 7000 HIL
15500 53000 HIL
8100 10000 HIL
11300 109000 HIL
15500 68000 HIL
8100 13000 HIL
9500 0 HIL
15500 350000 HIL
8100 78000 HIL
9500 0 HIL
15500 0 HIL
11300 304000 HIL
8300 0 HIL
11300 534000 HIL
15500 0 HIL
8700 0 HIL
2700 120000 HIL
2700 350000 HIL
3500 0 HIL
14000 0 HIL
8700 350000 HIL
11300 0 HIL
2000 206000 HIL
11300 182000 HIL
2200 300000 HIL
2000 0 HIL
continued next page
91
Table 11 continued
OSP «g HILLSBORO 3500 0 HIL89 GREENVILLE 2000 350000 HIL
EUD It
BOSCAWEN 3400 0 MER
HUD it CONCORD 30400 Q ^ER
HUD it
FRANKLIN 7900 o Zl
HUD 7^
HOPKINTON 3900 o Zl
TOD it
SALISBURY 1Q00 0 MER
HUD ~
n
2000 175000 Zl
HTTD nk CONCORD 30400 0 MFR
HUD il HENNIKER 3200 0 MER
HUD
HOOKSETT 7300 0 MER
HUD 7
?
8
CONCORD 30400 62000 MER
HUD 78
CONCORD 30400 349000 MER
HTTn nl PITTSFIELD 2900 0 MER
HUD 7Q
HOOKSETT 7300 0 MER
Hud 7
7
o
CONCORD 30400 351000 MER
SuD 7Q FRANKLIN 7900 0 MER
HUD 80
PITTSFIELD 2900 320663 MER
Sun o? CONCORD 30400 500000 MER
HUD 8
CONCORD 30400 450000 MER
Sun l\
FRANKLIN 7900 0 MER
HUD l\
PITTSFIELD 2900 300000 MER
Hun 11
CONCORD 30400 600000 MER
Hun R9
FRANKLIN 7900 500000 MER
PITTSFIELD 2900 455000 MER
°cp H CONCORD 30400 450000 MER
°li H PITTSFIELD 2900 351000 MER83 FRANKLIN 79000SP 83 PEMBROKE
0SP 84 CONCORD 30400
345000 MER
4900 400000 MER
J 500000 MER
Q
Q
A
A
FRANKLIN 7900 350000 MEROSP 84 PEMBROKE 4900 67683 MEROSP 85 CONCORD 30400 450000 MER0SP 85 FRANKLIN 7900 0 MER0SP 85 PITTSFIELD 2900 0 MER0SP 86 HENNIKER 3200 300000 MER
°Sp 86 WARNER 2000 316250 MER
MER
MER
MER
MER
MER
MER
MER
MER
0SP 87 CONCORD 30400 2840000SP 87 WARNER 2000 155000
osp 87 HENNIKER 3200 0
osp 88 WARNER 2000 250000
°SP 88 NORTHFIELD 3100 350000
osp 88 CONCORD 30400 221000
°SP 89 CONCORD 30400 125000
°SP 89 PITTSFIELD 2900 350000
osp 89 WARNER 2000 350000 MER
MER°SP 89 CONCORD 30400 345000
OSP 90 CONCORD 30400 122000 MER
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Table 11 continued
OSP 90
OSP 90
HUD 75
HUD 75
HUD 75
T_TT TT\HUD 75
TTTTPiHUD 75
TJ T T T\HUD 75
IJTTT~\HUU 76
nU JJ 76
HUU 7 6
HUU 76
HTTnnu JJ 77
nU JJ 77
HUD 77
HUU 78
HUD 78
HUD 78
HUD 79
HUD 79
HUD 79
HUD 79
HUD 80
HUD 80
TJTTr\HUD 80
UTTnHUD 80
TJT TT~\HUU 8
1
HUU 8 1
UTTnnu jj o 1
HTTP)n u jj Q 1OZ
Uor Q "3O J
Uor Q AO 4
Uor Q Ao 4
uor O 4
ncp Q /Io 4
ncpuor S3 /o 4
uor o 4
ncpUor Q COJ
ncDUoir O D
Uor
uor OD
OSP 87
OSP 88
OSP 88
OSP 89
OSP 89
WARNER 2
CONCORD 3 0
EPPING 3
EXETER ii
NEWMARKET 4
RAYMOND 5
DERRY 18
SALEM 24
EPPING 3
EXETER ii
DERRY 18
SALEM 24
EXETER 11
DERRY 18
SALEM 24
DEERFIELD 2
EXETER 11
RAYMOND 5
EXETER 11
RAYMOND 5
DERRY 18
SALEM 24
DERRY 18
EXETER 11
NEWMARKET 4
RAYMOND 5
DERRY 18
EXETER 11
NEWMARKET 4
DERRY 18
EPPING 3
EPPING 3
RAYMOND 5
RAYMOND 5
AUBURN 2
DERRY 18
LONDONDRRY 1
3
NEWMARKET 4
RAYMOND 5
DERRY 18
NORTHWOOD 2
EPPING 3
NORTHWOOD 2
EPPING 3
RAYMOND 5
NEWTON 3
n n nvj u u 1 C O O AnlobzOO MER
400 C A r> r\ r\ MER
500 U ROC
000 A n n n ntuuuu ROC
300 nu T~\ f~\ /-IROC
500 nu T"> f~~\ /~iROC
900 n RUL
200 37 000 DAPKUL
500 0 KUL
000 246000 KUL
900 86000V W V V V pnr1KUL
200 59000 KUL
000 0 KUL
900 o RHPKUL
200 7 3000/ J u y u KUL
000 n KUL
000 ou DAPKUL
500 nu RUL
000\J \J \J nu ROC
500 nu KUL
9 00
-s \J \J R A fi n n nD <i o u u u T"> /^\ /"IROC
2004U \J \J i n n n n n ROC
900 r-> /-\ /-iROC
000 ^ fi A n n n KUL
300 \J \J U KJ KJ KUL
500 n KUL
900 163000X w U U v U DAPKUL
000 o Rnr
300 600000 ROT
900 335000 ROC
500 400000 roc1\. v_y v^.
500 240000 ROC
500 166456 ROC
500 0 ROC
900 0 ROC
900 0 ROC
600 0 ROC
300 284660 ROC
500 276000 ROC
900 0 ROC
200 16000 ROC
500 0 ROC
200 0 ROC
500 0 ROC
500 212900 ROC
100 0 ROC
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Table 11 continued
HUD It
DURHAM 10 600 0 STR
HUD it FARMINGTON 4600 Q STR
HUD it ROLLNGSFRD 2400 0 STR
HUD it SOMERSWRTH 10400 191000 STR
HUD 77 SOMERSWRTH 10400 140000 STR
HUD dSmWRTH 10400 255°^ STR
HUD 78 MT?^ 10600 ° STR
HTin o
ILTON 2500 0 STR
Hun il NEWDURHAM 1200 0 STO
SuD 79 SOMERSWRTH 10400 350000 STR
HUD 80
SOMERSWRTH 10400 500000 STR
HUD 81
HUD 82
OSP 83
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 85
SOMERSWRTH 10400 350000 STRSOMERSWRTH 10400 505000 STR
SSP H SOMERSWRTH 10400 600000 STRSOMERSWRTH 10400 395000 STR
FARMINGTON 4600 355000 STR
FARMINGTON 4600 190000 STRSOMERSWRTH 10400 500000 STRSOMERSWRTH 10400 162250 STR
Op It SOMERSWRTH 10400 0 STR
nop It FARMINGTON 4600 200000 STR
nop It SOMERSWRTH 10400 217250 STR
"op p
6
,
SOMERSWRTH 10400 200000 STR
nop II FARMINGTON 4600 292500 STR
nop II MIDDLETON 800 196000 STR
°%l H MILTON 2500 130000 STR
OSP II
SOMERSWRTH 10400 0 STR™ 88 SOMERSWRTH 10400 319792 STRUbP 88 MIDDLETON 800 0 STR0SP 90 SOMERSWRTH 10400 825000 STR
HUD 75 NEWPORT 6300 137000 SULHUD 76 CHARLESTWN 4500 0 SULHUD 7 6 CLAREMONT 14500 0 SULHUD 76 NEWPORT 6300 225000 SULHUD 77 CLAREMONT 14500 250000 SUL
HUD 77 NEWPORT 6300 0
HUD 78 CLAREMONT 14500 400000
HUD 79 CLAREMONT 14500 400000
HUD 80 CLAREMONT 14500 400000
HUD 81 CLAREMONT 14500 0 SUL
HUD 81 CLAREMONT 14500 351500 SUL
HUD 82 CLAREMONT 14500 500000 SUL
osp 83 CLAREMONT 14500 45000 SUL
°SP 83 CLAREMONT 14500 355000 SUL
°SP 83 NEWPORT 6300 380000 SUL
OSP 84 CHARLESTWN 4500 227950 SUL
OSP 84 CLAREMONT 14500 323000 SUL
OSP 84 CLAREMONT 14500 177000 SUL
SUL
SUL
SUL
SUL
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Table 11 continued
OSP ft A
OSP ft A
OSP ft RO D
OSP ft R
OSP ft R
OSP 85
OSP 8 5
OSP ft fi
OSP
OSP
OSP 87o /
OSP a 7
OSP 8 7
OSP 8 fto o
OSP ft fto o
OSP ft fto o
OSP ftfto o
OSP 89
OSP 90
OSP 90
OSP 90
OSP 90
NEWPORT 6
CROYDON
CLAREMONT 14
LEMPSTER
NEWPORT 6
SUNAPEE 2
CLAREMONT 14
NEWPORT 6
CHARLESTWN 4
CLAREMONT 14
CHARLESTWN 4
CLAREMONT 14
CLAREMONT 14
CLAREMONT 14
NEWPORT 6
LITTLETON 5
UNITY 1
NEWPORT 6
NEWPORT 6
COLUMBIA
STARK
UNITY 1
300 113500 SUL
460 0 SUL
500 70640 SUL
700 287500 SUL
300 239000 SUL
300 131500 SUL
500 281000 SUL
300 286000 SUL
400 0 SUL
500 0 SUL
500 183000 SUL
500 265800 SUL
500 150000 SUL
500 0 SUL
300 0 SUL
600 350000 SUL
100 0 SUL
300 300000 SUL
300 350000 SUL
700 350000 SUL
500 350000 SUL
100 24000 SUL
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The geographic redistribution of grant funds reveals
some interesting patterns. The changes here, in general,
reflect some of the changes caused by the state's general
goal of more widely disbursing the funds. However, there is
no evidence that changing the geographic balance was either
implicitly or explicitly part of New Hampshire's plan. And
yet, looking at following summary table, there are some
significant shifts both in terms of grants, and most
importantly, in terms of applications.
TABLE 12
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION SUMMARY:
BY COUNTY
„ . A
_
. u .
BEL CAR CHE COO GRA HIL MER STR SUL ROC
# of Applications
12 7 9 23 23 27 23 14 12 28
° S
? . 11 12 21 29 42 11 25 16 27 16
r
T°tal 23 19 30 52 65 38 48 30 39 44Grand Total 388
# of Grants Made
HUD 5 3 7 11 7 14 11 8 9 140SP 9 8 15 27 33 6 22 13 22 7Total 14 11 22 38 40 20 33 21 31 21Grand Total 250
% of Apps. Funded
HUD 42 43 78 48 30 52 48 57 75 50
osp 82 67 72 93 79 55 88 81 81 44
To understand why these shifts occurred, it is
necessary to look at those counties which exhibit the
biggest percentage shifts between HUD ' s and OSP '
s
administration
.
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Hillsborough and Rockingham Counties
These two counties are the only two to show decreases
in applications or grants during the second eight years of
this study period, in fact, each of these counties show
decreases in each of these categories.
The reason, in both cases, seems to be the same. When
OSP took over the program, and changed the focus, the staff
in the towns who had been receiving grants quickly realized
that the criteria, especially the changes in low- and moder-
ate-income requirements, would effect their chances of being
funded. The first two grant rounds under OSP (1983 and
1984) confirmed their fears: Out of a total of 10 applica-
tions submitted from the two counties, only one was funded.
Being rational, the towns began submitting fewer applica-
tions until, during the three years from 1988 to 1990, there
was only one application from each of the counties.
Sullivan and Cheshire Counties
These counties are interesting because they demonstrate
the importance of technical assistance. The increased
number of applications and the success rate in these coun-
ties are almost entirely attributable to the involvement of
regional planning agencies (Southwest Region Planning Com-
mission in Cheshire County, Upper Valley - Lake Sunapee
Commission in Sullivan County) . In both cases the agencies
quickly became involved in the programs after the state took
over. This was a mutually beneficial arrangement between
the towns and the agencies.
in both cases the agencies both wrote grants and, if
the town desired, entered into contracts to administer those
grants awarded. m both cases the agencies received
technical assistance grants from the OSP to provide assis-
tance and workshops for towns in their regions. The success
of this arrangement is evident from the statistics.
Coos County
Coos County is an interesting case. The northern half
of New Hampshire is filled with rural poverty but, with the
exception of Berlin, no communities of any appreciable pop-
ulation are present. HUD
' s guidelines resulted in limited
involvement of program funds to assist this poor area. 11
This was not for lack of trying. The North Country Council
(the regional planning agency for this area) had been
working with the communities, trying to find a way to "break
into" the CDBG program money. Towns in Coos County had one
of the highest application rates in the state. Still, under
HUD, with the exception of Berlin, the towns were largely
unsuccessful
.
OSP's program changes turned that situation around.
Its emphasis on project-oriented solutions to specific high
need areas was tailor-made for the problems of the North
Country. Finally, all of those applications being submitted
were coming back approved. Under HUD, Coos County towns had
From 1975 to 1982 only eleven grants, a total of
$3,289,750 went to Coos County; 8 of these grants,
$2,766,000, went to Berlin.
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submitted 23 applications and had 11 of them approved, a
success rate of 47%. with DSP's changes, North Country
towns submitted 29 grants and saw 27 of them funded, an
impressive 93%.
Changes seen in the other counties can be attributed to
those same factors. The implications of the changes being
made by the state were clear to the towns (and the people at
the planning agencies) and they began to respond.
G. Activities
The implications of the new program priorities were
also being felt in the type of activities being undertaken
with program funds, although to some degree this area seems
to have been less effected than some of the other areas.
Before discussing the data, however, there ar some important
considerations that must be discussed. These directly
impact the validity of any statistical interpretation.
First, it must be noted that HUD, at the beginning of
the program, did not have the flexibility that became avail-
able in the program after 1981. Of particular note here are
the changes which added economic development as an allowable
activity and which allowed funds to be made available to
for-profit enterprises. Obviously, these changes made
possible, for the first time, the awarding of actual econom-
ic development grants.
Secondly, HUD ' s use of comprehensive grants as part of
its neighborhood targeting policy was significant. Between
1978 and 1982, the period during which HUD was using this
99
targeting strategy, 38% of the grants (17 of 45) awarded
were applied for under this comprehensive category.
Thirdly, and related to the point made above, these
comprehensive grants were, by all accounts, basically
housing rehabilitation grants with some public improvements
thrown in. The type of improvements depended on specific
neighborhoods' needs but generally were activities such as
sidewalk improvements, landscaping (adding trees and shrubs
along otherwise barren streetscapes ) or the development of
neighborhood mini-parks. since the overall emphasis in
these grants was housing, they have been included in that
category on the summary table, although they have been kept
separate in the detailed data also included elsewhere in
this study.
Lastly, this analysis is limited to only those grants
which were funded. This is due to the fact that HUD did not
keep records on what non-funded applicants had reguested.
Therefore, the detailed data included under HUD shows only
those funded; OSP data does show what was requested even if
no funds were received. No comparisons can be done given
this lack of HUD data.
Even with those limitations on the data in mind, it is
interesting to peruse the summary table. HUD ' s emphasis on
housing is evident throughout their administration; OSP '
s
attempts to spread the funds around comes through clearly.
Under each agency, however, there are some important factors
that account for the fact that, except for the major changes
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noted above, activities funded will not fluctuate wildly in
a small rural state like New Hampshire.
1) The emphasis on low- and moderate-income benefit. This
resulted in project activities in compact areas.
2) The limited funding available. This eliminates many
worthy projects that are just too big to be undertaken.
Housing projects can be adjusted simply (projecting 25 units
instead of 50); public facilities and economic development
projects are generally not so easily manipulated.
3) The CDBG program has always been seen as a source of
funds for projects which otherwise would not be done. Both
HUD and OSP included wording to the effect that priority
would be given to those applications "for which existing
public or private programs or sources of funds are not
otherwise available." (OSP, 1983a, p. 3) Once again,
especially in the early days, this favored housing rehabili-
tation projects. To some extent, this was a matter of
interpretation. Public facilities projects were given lower
impact scores if it by felt (by HUD or OSP) the community
could and should fund the project out of tax dollars.
Economic development projects were, and are, very closely
scrutinized to determine why private investors will not
provide the needed financing.
4) There are only so many projects able to be funded.
This is especially true in the area of economic development.
The match reguirements , close scrutiny and private sector
involvement makes these projects difficult to develop.
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The "Activities Funded" category is, then, a more
difficult area in which to track changes wrought by the
devolution. This is partly because of the many Congressio-
nal changes made in this area over the life of the program
and partly because of a number of other factors over which
the program administrators had no control.
TABLE 13
GRANT APPLICATIONS:
ANNUALLY BY ACTIVITY
AGENCY
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
FY TOWN POP FUNDSREC AC
78 BERLIN 13000 300000 CI7 ft/ o CLiAKaMUNT 14500 400000 CI7 ft UUJNLUKD 30400 349000 CI7 ft 15600 500000 CI78 SOMERSWRTH 10400 350000 r l
80 LEBANON 11200 400000 CI
81 BERLIN C f\ f\ f\ r\ r\600000 CI
81 CONCORD 30400 450000 CI
81 LACONIA 15600 500000 CI
81 NEWMARKET 4300 600000 CI
81 PITTSFIELD 2900 300000 CI
81 SOMERSWRTH 10400 505000 CI
82 CONCORD 30400 600000 CI
82 LACONIA 15600 600000 CI
82 LEBANON 11200 400000 CI
82 PITTSFIELD 2900 455000 CI
82 SOMERSWRTH 10400 600000 CI
79 BERLIN 13000 600000 C2
79 LACONIA 15600 400000 C2
79 CLAREMONT 14500 400000 C2
79 CONCORD 30400 351000 C2
79 SOMERSWRTH 10400 500000 C2
81 LEBANON 11200 400000 C2
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Table 13 continued
HUD 82 BERLIN
OSP 83 CONCORD
OSP 83 LACONIA
OSP 83
^ J- J- 1 or i EjLiJjOSP 83 C OTvTT? TD OrjnmTToUlYmKoWRTH
HUD 80 BERLIN
HUD 80 CLAREMONT
HUD 80 CONCORD
HUD 80 LACONIA
HUD 80 SOMERSWRTH
OSP 83 BERLIN
HUD 8
1
Ht?DD VJJiliKKi
HUD 82 CLAREMONT
HUD 82 T T CDHH
OSP 83
OSP 83 CONWAY
OSP 84 BERLIN
OSP 84 BERLIN
OSP 84 CLAREMONT
OSP 84 CLAREMONT
OSP 84 NEWPORT
OSP 84 WHITEFIFT.D
OSP 85 BETHLEHEM
OSP 85 CONWAY
OSP 85 LACONIA
OSP 85 LEBANON
OSP 85 NEWMARKET
OSP 85 PLYMOUTH
OSP 85 CLAREMONT
OSP 86 HENNTKFR1 1 i-J IN J.N 1i\LjI\
OSP 86 LACONT
A
OSP 86 LITTLETON
OSP 86 PLYMOUTH
OSP 87 GORHAM
OSP 87 LACONIA
OSP 87 CLAREMONT
HUD 75 BERLIN
l jUUU 500000 C2
JUtUU 450000 C2
15600 400000 C2
2900 351000 C2
10400 395000 C2
1 JUUU 300000 C3
1 A r n n 400000 C3
30400 500000 C3
300000 C3
10400 350000 C3
1 jUUU 400000 C3
18900 163000 ED
14500 500000 ED
1500 304000 ED
14500 355000 ED
7200 265000 ED
i 3onn Z 1 D U U U ED
13000 285000 ED
14500 323000 ED
14500 177000 ED
6300 113500 ED
1700 130361 ED
1800 230000 ED
7 ? on/ u u 1 0 0 U U ED
15600 500000 ED
11200 200000 ED
4300 284660 ED
5100 270000 ED
i a r n n Z o 1U U U ED
3200 300000 ED
15600 500000 ED
jOUU o o £ n nZ o O U U U ED
5100 175000 ED
3300 258500 ED
15600 348000 ED
14500 150000 ED
13000 20000 HR
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Table 13 continued
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
75 EXETER
75 KEENE
75 NEWPORT
75 SOMERSWRTH
75 GOFFSTOWN
7 6 EXETER
7 6 KEENE
7 6 NEWPORT
7 6 DERRY
77 BERLIN
77 CLAREMONT
77 CONCORD
7 7 KEENE
77 LEBANON
77 SOMERSWRTH
77 GOFFSTOWN
77 PELHAM
7 7 SALEM
11000
21500
6300
10400
11300
11000
21500
6300
18900
13000
14500
30400
21500
11200
10400
11300
8100
24200
7 P/ O 17" T71 T7> \ttiKEENE 21500
7 R LANCASTER 3400
7 P/ o PkLHAM 8100
79 KEENE 21500
79 PITTSFIELD 2900
79 DERRY 18900
79 SALEM 24200
80 DERRY 18900
80 EXETER 11000
80 LITTLETON 5600
80 NEWMARKET 4300
81 GOFFSTOWN 11300
81 WILTON 2700
82 DERRY 18900
82 FRANKLIN 7900
82 KEENE 21500
82 WINCHESTER 3500
83 CLAREMONT 14500
83 EPPING 3500
83 FARMINGTON 4600
83 FRANKLIN 7900
83 HINSDALE 3700
83 NEWPORT 6300
83 NRTHUMBRLD 2500
40000
50000
137000
191000
55000
246000
350000
225000
86000
312500
250000
62000
119500
190000
255000
109000
13000
73000
300000
174250
78000
281500
320663
548000
100000
400000
364000
400000
400000
534000
120000
335000
500000
460000
365000
45000
400000
355000
345000
400000
380000
400000
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
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Table 13 continued
OSP D "3O O PEMBROKE
OSP ft ^ WINCHESTER
OSP ft A CONWAY
OSP ft4O He CUNCORD
OSP 84 aJrF IMG
OSP 84 r HKjyi l in LrTON
OSP 84 T?D AMT/T txtr KAJNJ\LiIN
OSP 84
xi 1 JN bDALE
OSP 84
OSP 84 PEMBROKE
OSP 84 SOMERSWRTH
OSP 84
OSP 84
OSP 84 T I? "D 7\ MAMLiJirSAJMUN
OSP 84 J-il 1 ILihi I CJN
OSP ftR CULiiLBROOK
OSP ft S v^UIMLUKD
OSP ft 5 Ut\Li 1 UJN
OSP 85 i-iiilN UAr r
OSP ft R LiEMPSTER
OSP 85 LISBON
OSP 85 MILFORD
OSP 8 5 IN dWJrUK 1
OSP ft R oUJYlJiKbWKTH
OSP 85
OSP 85 TROVX IVW I
OSP 86 LJ i-i 1 I i Ij IIj ii JZj lv±
OSP 86 DALTON
OSP 86 FARMINGTON
OSP 86 GREENVILLE
OSP 86 HINSDALE
OSP 86 KEENE
OSP 86 NEWPORT
OSP 86 NRTHUMBRLDX 1 X V -L 11 Wl 11_J XVJ_J L-/
OSP 86 SOMERSWRTH
OSP 86 WINCHFSTFRVI 111 vvllijO X ill i\
OSP 87 CLARFMONT
OSP 87 rnMPDRnw IN ^UI\L/
OSP 87 FlDR PHP tit R
OSP 87 n.i-i v n i\.n ± ±j±j
OSP 87 LISBON
OSP 87 MIDDLETON
OSP 87 MILTON
OSP 87 PITTSBURG
OSP 87 STWARTSTWN
4900 400000 HR
3500 325904 HRxi rv
7200 294500 HR
30400 500000 HR
3500 240000 HR
4600 190000 HR
7900 350000 HR
3700 325000 HR
2500 297500 HR
4 q ft nt U U 67 683 HR
10400 500000 HR
3500 336000 HR
21500 63400 HR
11200 154350 HR
5600 71000 HR
4500 350000 HR
30400 450000 HR
700 350000 HR
300 350000 HR
700 287500 HR
Q n n c\o / U U 350000 HR
8700 350000 HR
6300 239000 HR
10400 162250 HR
2300 131500 HR
2100 217000 HR
1800 200000 HR
700 144600 HR
4600 200000 HR
2000 206000 HR
4700 9 9^1 ft ft nK
21500 275000 HR
6300 286000 HR
2500 350000 HR
10400 217250 HR
3500 234300 HR
14500 265800 HR
30400 284000 HR
300 176400 HR
3400 300000 HR
1500 117600 HR
800 196000 HR
2500 130000 HR
800 300000 HR
1000 350000 HR
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Table 13 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
87 WINCHESTER
87 WOODSTOCK
88 LACONIA
88 COLUMBIA
88 LISBON
88 COLEBROOK
88 SOMERSWRTH
88 WARNER
88 KEENE
88 MADISON
88 NORTHFIELD
89 TILTON
8 9 LACONIA
89 HAVERHILL
89 NEWPORT
89 GREENVILLE
89 GRAFTON
89 STEWRTSTWN
8 9 WARREN
89 CONCORD
8 9 LYMAN
89 BATH
OSP 90 NEWPORT
OSP 90 COLUMBIA
OSP 90 STARK
OSP 90 WENTWORTH
OSP 90 CANAAN
OSP 90 TILTON
OSP 90 COLEBROOK
OSP 90 CONCORD
OSP 90 CLARKSVILL
HUD 75 WARNER
HUD 75 WOODSTOCK
HUD 75 MERRIMACK
HUD 75 MILFORD
HUD 75 SALEM
HUD 75 PELHAM
HUD 76 SOMERSWRTH
HUD 76 MERRIMACK
HUD 76 PELHAM
HUD 76 SALEM
HUD 77 MERRIMACK
3500
1000
15600
700
1500
4500
10400
2000
21500
1100
3100
3400
15600
3400
6300
2000
800
1000
700
30400
300
800
6300
700
500
600
2500
3400
4500
30400
300
2000
1000
15500
8700
24200
8100
10400
15500
8100
24200
326000
300000
361000
250000
232400
350000
319792
250000
500000
300000
350000
350000
396450
350000
300000
350000
350000
335000
350000
345000
350000
215000
350000
350000
350000
350000
350000
500000
225000
60000
296000
175000
282000
24800
9200
37000
7000
140000
53000
10000
59000
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
15500 68000 PF
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Table 13 continued
HUD 78 MERRIMACK IodUO
HUU 79 NRTHUMBRLD 2500HUD 79 OSSIPEE
HUD 80 GOFFSTOWN 11300
nuu 80 OSSIPEE 2500
n u u 8 1 CLAREMONT 14500HUD 81 OSSIPEE 9 son
-J \J \JHUD 81 WHITEFIELD 1 70n
OSP 83 WOODSTOCK i oooX \J \J VJ
OSP 84 CANAAN 9 s n n
OSP 84 CHARLESTWN 4500Ubr 84 HAVERHILL 3400
OSP 84 KEENE 9 1 s n n
OSP 84 LACONIA 1 s n n
OSP 84 RAYMOND J ouu
OSP 84 WILTON 9 7 n n
AnnUbF 85 BERLIN 13000
OSP 85 CANAAN 25001
OSP 85 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 85 RAYMOND 5500
OSP 85 WOLFEBORO 4000
OSP 86 ASHLAND 1800
OSP 86 BERLIN 13000
OSP 86 CANAAN 2500
OSP 86 LEBANON 11200
OSP 86 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 86 TAMWORTH 1700
OSP 86 WARNER 2000
OSP 86 GOFFSTOWN 11300
OSP 86 NORTHWOOD 2200
350000
178500
391373
304000
400000
351500
500000
275000
400000
200000
227950
239500
160000
291800
166456
350000
125100
178000
70640
276000
300000
334100
874900
172000
109250
200000
190000
316250
182000
16000
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
OSP 87 ANTRIM 2200 300000 PF
OSP 87 BERLIN 13000 188000 PF
OSP 87 CHARLESTWN 4500 183000 PF
OSP 87 DALTON 700 129600 PF
OSP 87 FARMINGTON 4600 292500 PF
OSP 87 KEENE 21500 195000 PF
OSP 87 WARNER 2000 155000 PF
OSP 87 WHITEFIELD 1700 286200 PF
OSP 88 WINCHESTER 3500 350000 PF
OSP 88 LITTLETON 5600 350000 PF
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Table 13 continued
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
OSP
88 CONCORD
88 BATH
89 CONCORD
89 KEENE
89 r ± 1 l IELD
89 LITTLETON
89 WHITEFIELD
89 OSSIPEE
89 WARNER
89 RAYMOND
90 CONCORD
90 WHITEFIELD
90 WARNER
90 SOMERSWRTH
90 HAVERHILL
90 UNITY
30400
800
30400
21500
2900
5600
1700
2500
2000
5500
30400
1700
2000
10400
3400
1100
221000
26450
125000
200000
350000
150000
250000
350000
350000
212900
122000
350000
168200
825000
350000
24000
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
PF
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CHAPTER V
INTERVIEWS
A. Introduction
The changes, when viewed in the harsh light of
statistics, are quite clear: The devolution profoundly
changed the distribution of funds. But, in politics as in
life, redistribution of resources results in winners and
losers. Real people are affected, sone positively, some
negatively
.
This section looks at how some of the people most
closely associated with the program perceived these changes.
The four people interviewed in depth for this section had a
variety of backgrounds and were each involved in a different
type of situation relative to the CDBG program. But all had
one thing in common, they were all involved with the program
in New Hampshire both while it was administered by HUD and
then after it became a program run by OSP. m fact, each is
still involved, in some way, with the program.
These people were chosen because, in addition to their
extensive experience with the devolution, each one worked in
a situation which was representative of the experience of
other communities. Although not precisely "models" of how
the program effected various communities differently,
certainly the patterns suggested by their experiences were
replicated elsewhere.
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B. Larry Goss and the State
In addition to hearing from representatives of
communities which were involved both under HUD and OSP, it
seems appropriate to allow a spokesman for the state to
explain what happened and, from his perspective, why. But
in another sense, Larry Goss speaks not only for the state,
but also for all of those communities not funded under HUD,
but successful under OSP
.
He earned that right because he
was essentially the architect of OSP
' s program.
He did that while serving the then new position of CDBG
Project Manager. Goss (who has a Ph.D. in Geography) had
been at OSP for six years when, in 1982, he was chosen to
head up the new state program. His involvement began when
he was assigned to be the liaison between the state and HUD.
In that position, he observed the HUD scoring and
monitoring process, analyzed the HUD rules, and met with
other states who were in the process of accepting
administration of the program. He was also charged with the
responsibility of working with the department heads,
legislators and OSP staff and developing a set of rules that
would be acceptable to HUD and accomplish the goals that the
state had set.
Goss started out by analyzing those things which he
felt were significant issues that needed to be addressed for
the OSP to develop the program along the lines it had in
mind. As he points out, OSP had been working on a number of
development projects that prepared it for the take over.
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Prior to 1983, Goss had worked on projects with the
Economic Development Agency ( EDA) and Farmers Home
Administration ( FHA
) The EDA project had resulted in a
statewide study of regional economic conditions. The FHA
projects had involved studies of public housing and water
and sewer priorities on a town by town basis.
This experience resulted in two things. First, OSP had
a data base and analytic papers on the problems and
projects, statewide, in just those areas the CDBG program is
designed to address. Second, it eliminated any need to
agonize over where the program would be housed.
In other states there were usually battles for the
program and the administrative funds tied to it. Economic
development agencies, statewide housing authorities, and
environmental services departments sometimes had bitter
struggles over who would administer the program. This did
not happen in New Hampshire: "Everybody recognized that OSP
was the logical place to house this program," Goss
explained
.
C. Jeff Taylor and Berlin
Jeff Taylor, in his present position as Director of the
Office of State Planning, is responsible for overseeing the
Community Development Block Grant Program in New Hampshire.
This position also makes him the chairman of the Community
Development Advisory Board and it is his job to recommend
and explain policy changes to the board.
In 1977, Taylor began a job as an Assistant Planner in
the Develops Office in the City of Berlin.- Berlin is
-
city of just over 13 ,000 people in New Harcpshire's "North
Country," in Coos County
. The area ^ ^
economically depressed and depends largely on forestry and
the paper industry for its employment. The 1980 census
found that the median family income in Berlin was $17,267.
in 1983, the first year the state began administering the
program, 10.9% of the population was receiving human service
assistance." The unemployment rate for the Labor Market
Area was 10.6%.
By 1983, Taylor had been promoted to Community
Development Director, which made him directly responsible
for applying for and administering the city's CDBG program.
This direct responsibility changed to general oversight in
1985 when he became Development Director, a position which
put him charge of all of Berlin's planning, zoning and code
enforcement function. it was while he was serving in that
capacity that Governor Judd Gregg asked him to become the
Director of the Office of State Planning. Taylor has had
significant experience, therefore, in a truly needy
community and is now in a position to have a good overview
of the program statewide.
Like many towns of Germanic names during World War II,
Berlin changed the pronunciation of its name, putting the
accent on the first syllable.
This includes Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Food Stamps, or Fuel Assistance.
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D. Bill Ray and Laconia
Laconia is a city with a year round population of
15,600 in the Lakes Region of New Hampshire, familiar to
visitors from all over the world. it is located on Lake
Winnipesaukee; the popular Weirs Beach resort is within its
limits. Tourism is the main industry, and like many
seasonal resort areas, it has its unattractive side. This
side is populated by those people who "do okay" during the
summer and then scratch to exist during the off-season. The
unemployment rate in an area like this fluctuates wildly (as
does the population) but in 1983 it averaged 6.8%. The
median income, according to the 1980 census, was $17,448,
slightly higher than Berlin's; the percentage of people
receiving human services assistance was 9.1%, lower than
Berlin
' s
.
After earning his Bachelor of Science degree in
Oceanography, William (Bill) Ray began working in Laconia in
1978 when he became a planner for the Lakes Region Planning
Commission. One of his responsibilities was to gather the
statistics necessary for Laconia
' s Community Development
Block Grant applications to HUD. This led to his position
as Community Development Specialist with the city, in which
he was responsible for grant-writing and administration for
the CDBG program from 1979 to 1984, spanning both HUD * s and
OSP ' s administrations.
In 1984 Ray went to work at OSP as a CDBG grant monitor
and is presently the Community Development Program Manager.
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He is directly responsible for OSP s administration of the
CDBG program staff.
E. Linda Mangones and Keene
Linda Mangones is the only person interviewed who has
had CDBG experience with more than one community. She
worked in Berlin, with Taylor, during 1978 and 1979 after
which she moved to the city of Claremont She worked
there from 1979 to 1981, when she moved to Keene.
Keene is a city of nearly 23,000 people in the
Monadnock Region of southwestern New Hampshire. This
section of the state has always been considered more
"recession proof" than other areas. Keene has a state
college, several large, healthy manufacturers, an airport
and a strong tourist industry. Being one of those places in
New Hampshire that "you can't get there from here", because
of the notoriously poor transportation system in that part
of the state, Keene has avoided many of the ups and downs
the rest of the state has experienced during the 1970s and
1980s. The 1980 census showed the median family income in
Keene to be $19,743, nearly $2,500 more than Berlin and more
than $2,000 greater than Laconia. There were 8.2% of the
people receiving human service help in 1983, 2.7% less than
Berlin
.
Claremont is an economically disadvantaged town on the
Connecticut River which was at one time a thriving mill
town. It didn't adapt well to changing times and now has
areas dominated by deteriorating old mills and mill housing
in substandard condition.
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Mangones works for the Keene Housing Authority (KHA)
which has had responsibility for administering the CDBG
program for the city since its inception. There are
apparency a number of reasons this occurred, but it seems
to have principally been a result of the fact that the KHA
had a strong relationship with HUD in the early 19 70s when
HUD began administering the program. This has not been an
impediment to doing other types of projects: in addition to
several housing rehabilitation projects, Keene has received
grants under both the public facilities and economic
development categories. Mangones has written and
administered grants under all three categories during her
time in Keene.
F. General Changes
Program changes as a result of the devolution to the
states, those interviewed agreed, were not accidental. They
were the result of a conscious shift in philosophy. This
showed up in two general areas with some overlap. Both went
to the heart of the program, both dealt with the key
question: what is the purpose of the CDBG program in New
Hampshire?
First there was the issue that revolved around the
program's roots. As Taylor put it, "There was a change in
philosophy... HUD had a Model Cities/ Urban Renewal
orientation..." This led to HUD ' s emphasis on
comprehensive, neighborhood projects. Most of the
municipalities who were receiving funds under HUD had grown
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to expect these comprehensive, multi-year (generally three
year) commitments.
m fact, HUD had been doing their best to provide more
help to the already assisted communities. As federal
funding increased, HUD did not make an effort to disburse
the money to more communities. instead, they began
"increasing the money available for each grant," according
to Taylor.
Laconia and Berlin were each tied heavily into the
system. Each had received two, three-year comprehensive
grants beginning in 1978. Keene, although it had not
applied for any comprehensive grants because of a lack of
"pockets of poverty, according to Mangones, was funded for
six of the eight years HUD ran the program. These three
communities had a large stake in any changes to the program.
In Laconia, "We were scared to death the state was
going to ruin the program," claimed Ray. Laconia was "used
to the system" and had two major concerns, "both of which
occurred." These two concerns, Ray recalled, were, first,
"that the state's emphasis would be on single projects."
This would not permit them to continue the neighborhood by
neighborhood clean up approach that Laconia had adopted.
Secondly, Laconia, like all of the recipients favored
by HUD, was concerned "that the state would spread out the
money to more communities." Even though they knew that
Laconia should be competitive, actually needing to be ranked
with many smaller, but possibly needier, communities, meant
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that Laconia
"couldn't count on the money... that became the
issue," according to Ray.
Of course, this was exactly what the state had set out
to do. as Goss explained, We set out to help small towns
get involved... and to fund more communities.- This
emphasis, as has been seen before, shows up repeatedly in
state documents as a specific intention of the state
administration
.
Some communities who had been receiving funds regularly
saw another problem. Disbursing the money "doesn't help
communities build their own capacity... it ruined job
security... You have too many inexperienced people running
programs," claims Mangones. Larry Goss agreed that it has
made "hiring staff long-term" difficult. He pointed out
that towns turned to regional planning commissions for the
expertise needed, a situation which will be discussed in
greater detail later.
The second general area in which this philosophical
shift showed up was in the activities emphasized. There was
some disagreement among the interviewees as to how dramatic
this shift was, or in fact, if any change took place in this
area. The general consensus seemed to be that the state
intended for a change to occur, but other factors kept it
from being significant.
HUD, it was generally conceded, emphasized housing and
related neighborhood improvements. This being, once again,
an outgrowth of its Model Cities roots. According to Goss,
the state set out
-to give .U three categories egual
opportunity,. He admitted that this was not as successful
i«plemented as he had hoped.
.Housing was still a focus
because there were large unmet needs." There were small
towns in New Hampshire "which looked like Appalachian but
hadn't qualified under HUD's administration. He proudly
stated that some of OSP
• s "initial projects had major
impacts" on those communities
.
Another reason that New Hampshire ended up having "one
of the most housing-oriented programs in the United States,"
Goss claimed, was the general feeling that the state "didn't
want to give towns money for things they could and should be
doing themselves." As Mangones explains it, the towns tend
to apply for housing money from the CDBG program because it
"is one of the few sources of funds available for housing."
New Hampshire's emphasis on housing remains unusual.
Goss, who has closely watched the development of the states'
programs nationwide points out that different areas of the
country have "different needs... a different focus. The
midwest is primarily doing economic development... the
states out west emphasize water and sewer expansions... Even
other places in New England are concentrating on
infrastructure.
"
Even though housing has been emphasized in New
Hampshire regardless of whether HUD or OSP has been
administering the program, it is necessary to point out that
there have been exceptions. Berlin, apparently because of
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the severely depressed economic conditions of the community,
was allowed, even under HUD, to have some leeway in the
expenditure of its funds. - It „as much easier in the early
years (before the 1978 reauthorization, to do more
speculative projects... especially in the area of economic
development," says Taylor. •Everything „e did was geared
toward some form of economic development... economic
development does not happen overnight... there is a need for
front-end investments."
In general, the communities which were most distressed
in the eyes of HUD were apparently given more latitude in
how the spend their money. Mangones, who worked with the
program under HUD in two communities considered to be much
worse off than Keene, admitted that "the kind of program we
ran in Claremont and Berlin would simply have been
inappropriate in Keene." She explained by pointing out that
"when you weren't fighting for the money more of it went to
public works types projects." Precisely, says Goss, why the
rules were changed to "make it difficult to do public works
projects that communities should do themselves."
G. Flexibility
In spite of the apparently somewhat arbitrary
application of certain rules to allow some communities
latitude in their programs, each interviewee saw
"flexibility" as being a major advantage of OSP
administration. As Goss explained it, that was certainly by
design. "In some states the rules can only be changed by
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legislation... they are written into law." New Hampshire's
legislation gave the Advisory Committee the authority to
"prepare the necessary regulations."
Another function of the <5t-*i-o •r n s ate Advisory Board which
increased the state's ability to respond to the needs of the
communities was its ability to hear appeals on every aspect
of the program. If a municipality feels it had been scored
unfairly, if it feels it is being asked to do an
unreasonable amount of administrative work, or if it
believes it has been unfairly monitored at the end of a
project it can appeal to the advisory committee.
Mangones sees this as a major advantage over the system
at HUD, where complaints were handled by the same staff
people who had made the original decisions. She explained:
"One of the big changes that we've taken advantage of is
OSP's appeal procedure, because there was never any appeal
possible before. And we've appealed virtually every adverse
decision against us." Although she admits that "We've won in
a lot of cases, but not in all," she still believes every
appeal has made a difference. "Sometimes we've lost the
appeal but the next time there's a rule change it brings the
program closer to our position." Certainly, she believes,
that is a sign that the OSP is listening to the communities.
Others also point to the fact that this flexibility
gave local participants a chance to see their input
implemented. According to Goss, "Local input had a great
impact on program design... several gave input regularly."
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Did the local official, feel this made a difference?
Certainly they did in the case of Reene; „ they , ve
to the changing times... they have responded in some fashion
to every suggestion we've made," claimed Mangones
. "As
aggravating as it sometimes been to work with the state, the
flexibility has helped." It is definitely "easier to impact
the program now that they made the rules at the state
level . "
The state has used this flexibility to address several
important issues. Goss points out that New Hampshire is the
"...first state in the country to use CDBG funds to help
tenants in mobile home park buy-outs." That came about as
the result of a well-publicized situation where a park owner
intended to sell the park land to a developer and displace
the tenants, who owned their homes but rented their lots.
The CDBG rules were rewritten to allow the funds to be used
to assist in such cases.
In Mangones' opinion, "a major improvement" in the
program related to the rules "specifically authorizing
social service facilities." This change allowed a number of
agencies to band together to purchase space and to increase
client convenience. "Before the change, these projects had
to be handled as economic development projects."
Taylor also believed that the state had used its
flexibility to improve the program. "The one significant
change I saw by OSP... was doing away with application
deadlines for economic development..." He was referring to
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the fact that under HUD, and at first under 0SP
, all types
of grant applications had to be submitted at the same time
each year, generally in January. Allowing economic grants
to be submitted on a "rollinrr- un-ling basis, Taylor contends, shows
that the state recognizes "that projects come on a
continuing basis and the only way to deal with them in a
responsible fashion is to respond in kind."
H. Low- and Moderate-Income Requirements
The program's emphasis on low- and moderate-income
benefit has been consistent since its inception.
Repeatedly, this national objective was emphasized. Even
though there were two other national objectives -
elimination of slums and blight and elimination of health
and safety threats
- which did not legally required low- and
moderate-income benefit, HUD has generally emphasized that
aspect of the program.
There were two ways in which OSP changed how HUD had
implemented this objective. First, the federal regulations
required that "maximum feasible priority" be given to
projects that benefit households in these income groups.
HUD could look at the projects and decide if this standard
was being met.
The state's regulations made this standard more
stringent and more specific. It designed into the program a
"Threshold Requirement" that 51% of CDBG funds be used to
benefit low- and moderate-income households, and developed
very specific statistical data gathering techniques to
determine compliance. This clear emphasis on making sure
that a majority of the money is spent directly to help
disadvantaged income groups is unusual among state programs.
It was a decision the state made; If there were to be
limited funds spent, it should be spent on those most needy.
As Ray explained, "other states don't necessarily do that...
that's a state choice."
This choice affected different communities in different
ways. For new communities, not in the system, it was a
requirement that they needed to develop new programs around.
For communities with existing programs, it was an issue they
needed to address. For many it was no problem.
As Taylor said, after searching his memory, "I don't
remember that being an issue at all." Berlin, after all,
was such a depressed area that every project they had done
fell into that category with no special effort. Ray
recollects that it did cause Laconia to take a closer look
at the neighborhoods they had been working in and to analyze
their proposed projects more closely. But it did not
prevent funding because, he pointed out, unlike other
communities, "Laconia had the advantage of having low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods."
Keene was one of those communities which did have a
problem with this criteria. According to Mangones, the
state's focus on small contiguous neighborhood projects made
it difficult for Keene to develop a project. Keene, she
points out, has "no clear pockets of poverty. It is
difficult to design an application around neighborhood
impact .
"
The second way in which OSP changed HUD
' s use of the
low- and moderate-income emphasis was in the scoring system.
Under HUD, points were awarded based on the "absolute number
of poverty persons" as well as "percentage of poverty
persons" found in each community. According to Goss, when
he was analyzing HUD s scoring system, he recognized that
giving more weight to "counts rather than percentages...
helped larger cities." OSP changed the criteria to focus on
percentages alone specifically to help "the towns in the
North Country" and other small towns that had large
percentage of low- and moderate-income people, but not large
numbers
.
Once again, this affected communities differently.
Berlin saw no change. Laconia and Keene needed to struggle.
As Mangones pointed out, under HUD "the scoring system...
gave so many points for the number of low- and moderate-
income people... that the larger cities were guaranteed
funding if they proposed an eligible project." Under OSP,
that was no longer true.
Each side of this debate made valid points. Goss felt
strongly that "poor people in Winchester (a small
economically depressed town near Keene) have as much right
to have access to those funds as Keene." Mangones, just as
emphatically, complains that under OSP ' s system the benefits
a grant "might go to three hundred low income people in
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Winchester rather than a thousand low income people in
Keene." Each of those interviewed did agree that,
statewide, Mangones was accurate when she observed: "That
single scoring change had a major impact on the distribution
of grant funds .
"
I
.
Outreach
The state made a commitment from the beginning to
provide more assistance to the smaller towns. By all
accounts, this has been successful in helping towns obtain
and properly administer these grants. The state actually
had a three-pronged approach: direct technical assistance;
feasibility grants; and indirect assistance through the
regional planning agencies (RPAs).
The direct technical assistance from the state was
apparently guite a change from what HUD had provided.
Mangones was never surprised that small towns, without
trained staff, did not even attempt to obtain grants. "HUD
just sent you the rules... you had to go through them
yourself and figure them out." Not an easy task, she
maintained "even for professional local administrators."
Even when HUD did put on workshops, they tended to deal with
specific topics, like relocation. Never did she recall one
"that would help you figure out the nuts and bolts like how
to keep the books .
"
She went on to praise OSP ' s outreach efforts. "One of
the good things OSP has done is the handbook." This, she
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explained, covered a number of very practical topics in
great detail. 15
Also, she remarked that OSP offers "detailed" workshop
on very specific topics. These often feature not only state
staff but also local practitioners that share their
experiences. This is especially helpful to new grantees,
but "I always learn one or two very helpful things."
Taylor concurred with this assessment. When trying to
encourage small towns with needs to apply, OSP does a "much
stronger outreach effort." Once the grant has been awarded
the state, unlike HUD, does not disappear until the end of
the program. "OSP provides much more technical assistance
during the grant period." He went on to explain that, once
again, that was by design. "HUD had one field person to
cover all of New Hampshire. OSP has four grant
representatives, one administrative person and a program
manager... OSP can and should do more outreach."
The feasibility grant concept had been developed, but
never used by HUD. The only interviewee that had any
experience with feasibility grants was Goss, who pushed to
see them enacted, and then helped convince the state that
using some of their administrative funds to help the
communities would provide significant benefits. He believed
that had happened.
15 The sections of OSP ' s Implementation Guide are:
Introduction; environmental reviews; financial management;
procurement; contract administration; EEO/fair housing;
acquisition/ relocation; and audit/ closeout.
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Lastly, there was ogp . s dec . s . on ^ prov . de ind^ect
technical assistance through regional planning agencies
.
Thrs was a decision based on practical realities. OSP
didn't have the CD staff that would have been necessary to
u, the communities that the RPAs did. From the beginning,
Goes maintains, the state "envisioned that RPAs would play
an active role .
"
The state did not leave this linkage to chance. it
held meetings with the agencies and explained how the
involvement could help the state, the towns and the
agencies. And, as an extra incentive, according to Ray, the
state "gave $3,000 to $5,000 to each RPA.
. . to get them to
be the technical assistance people in the fields." This, as
has been documented, was more successful in some region's
than others.
By some accounts, without this RPA - town connection it
would be virtually impossible for the state to have reached
its goal of disbursing the funds more widely and to smaller
towns. As Mangones simply puts it, "in the absence of the
regional planning agencies most of these small towns
wouldn't be involved." This is conceded by the state, and
it continues to encourage the agencies to help the towns in
their regions.
J. Scoring
The reaction to the most far-reaching scoring change,
involving low- and moderate-income factors, has already been
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recounted. m general, according to Goss, the state system
was designed to further its goals. For example, "The point
system was designed to favor the poorest towns..." state
personnel did everything they could to encourage
participation. Goss pointed out that most states required
matching funds from any community that applied. New
Hampshire did not emphasize that in the scoring system
because "we did not want to discourage participation."
Also, partly because it had very specific objectives
for the OSP program, the state's rules were much more
specific in terms of what information it required and what
points would be awarded for each project. This was an
advantage for, as Mangones put it, it "was harder to write
to the scoring system" under HUD. And that was, in fact,
what occurred, throughout the state.
Ray remembers that "HUD had pushed their priorities
more heavily" than OSP was doing. But, even though OSP was
obviously shifting the emphasis, Ray felt that OSP
' s system
generally "let the locals identify their needs..." Then,
cracked Ray, "the good grantsmen in Laconia looked at the
rules and designed a project to fit the rules and score the
most points possible..." This was not difficult in most
scoring categories if you were working on housing
rehabilitation projects because "priorities didn't really
change, except for the comprehensive nature of the program.
The emphasis was always on housing. . . partly because of the
age of the housing stock..."
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Once again, the situation in Berlin was not affected by
changes in the scoring system. Taylor pointed out that
"there was a strong bias toward housing" at HUD. But the
scoring changes, like much else in the devolution, had
little impact. I could basically do the same projects
under the OSP system," explained Taylor.
K. Oversight and Monitoring
Another aspect of the program that underwent
significant changes because of the devolution was in the
oversight and monitoring of program regulations. The
regulations themselves did not undergo changes specifically
because virtually all of them are a result of Congressional
legislation. There were, of course, changes, such as
dropping the requirement that communities produce Housing
Assistance Plans. But these were the result of changes in
the philosophies of administrations, not specifically the
devolution. The difference was in how oversight and
monitoring for violations of these regulations were done.
HUD, as it had with technical assistance, did the very
least possible. Once funding a project, HUD generally did
no oversight until the monitoring session at the end of the
project. This was difficult for all communities, impossible
for smaller communities. The myriad and detailed
regulations which, as has been discussed, were not ever made
clear under HUD, were expected to be closely adhered to when
the final monitoring was done. If HUD felt that a community
misspent money, it could demand repayment. As Mangones put
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it, "with HUD, the danger was getting hit with their
requirements not made clear in their regulations."
Her opinion on this came from personal experience.
When she moved to Claremont to administer the CDBG program
there, she took over from a person in a program that "was
being run in a reasonable, responsible way." But, as she
immediately recognized, was not consistent with expectations
HUD would have when they came to monitor. She spent a great
deal of time "trying to arrange material in the way I knew
HUD would want it." still, when HUD finally monitored the
project, she received a letter from HUD containing negative
findings "eight pages long... in every case an error of
omission." it made her realize that under HUD
' s system even
"well-meaning, competent people made mistakes."
OSP, by all accounts, was much more involved and
helpful when it came to understanding the regulations. in
addition to the previously mentioned handbook, Taylor
claimed that "that on the ground experience, that reaching
out to see what was going on in the communities didn't
happen with HUD... Quarterly monitoring, as OSP does, is
essential for the smaller communities" and also helped the
state staff "get a feel for" what was happening with
projects
.
OSP, according to Mangones, "does a thousand times more
monitoring" than HUD. Although this is somewhat time-
consuming, this periodic oversight "makes the final
monitoring session go a whole lot smoother... Approval in
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the beginning means more work ud front h„t ™^ tJ r ° ou no surprises at
the end.
"
L. Suggestions and Conclusions
The interviewees felt that there were things presently
done in the program that should be changed. Interestingly,
when asked to name such changes, the recommendations had
nothing to do with the way OSP was administering the
program. Recommendations all suggested changes that could
only be made by changes in the legislation. The two
regulations repeatedly mentioned as "irrelevant- to small
town programs in New Hampshire were the Davis-Bacon Wage
Rate requirement and the Single-audit Act.
The stipulations in the Davis-Bacon Act that require
projects undertaken with CDBG money pay workers "the
prevailing wage" in an area have always required
"unnecessary paperwork for small communities," according to
Ray. What is even more irritating is that "they're never
really relevant." This is because the determinations are
always based on urban areas and don't take into account the
more volatile labor markets in rural areas. For example,
Ray says, during the mid-1980s, when the construction
industry was booming in New Hampshire, the Davis-Bacon rates
were so low that the weekly interviews and projects which
grant recipients were forced to do was a waste of time.
"You couldn't have hired people at those wages."
Now, however, as things have slowed down and everyone
is trying to cut costs to save taxpayer money, "the
so
' c
artificially high rates are pushing up the costs of
projects." to deal with this built-in problem, Ray
believes, "there should be a higher cut <on the dollar value
of a project before the Davis-Bacon wage rates kick in) or a
rural exception.
"
The second regulation mentioned by each of those
interviewed as unnecessary is the Single-audit Act. Thi
requires that every community that accepts these funds t
have their town records audited annually by Certified Publi
Accountants and that CDBG program funds be part of the audit
process
.
Goss believes that Congress should eliminate this
requirement for communities under "25,000 or so." "For
smaller communities, project audits make more sense and
would be more useful to the monitor." He points out that
many towns in New Hampshire "still have elected town
auditors... these town's budgets are so small that this
requirement only results in unnecessary expenses and
paperwork." Ray concurs. "The Single-audit Act is an
example of paperwork that is not relevant... it was not
designed for single-purpose projects in small communities."
Even though there are still concerns about the program,
it is clear that each person interviewed believed the
devolution had a positive overall impact. Even in cases
where they believed it had a negative effect, or no effect
at all, on communities with which they had worked, they
recognized the overall positive impact of the change. Bill
Ray, looking back to his experiences with the program, mused
that "there were probably no advantages to those towns which
were already recipients. To other communities, it was
definitely positive." Since that was a major part of the
state's reason for taking over the administration of the
program, Ray admitted that the switch "was a success."
Jeff Taylor, speaking of Berlin's experience, felt that
for them it just "resulted in another level of bureaucracy."
They were receiving money regularly anyway. Upon
reflection, however, he acknowledged that "OSP brought the
program closer to communities," a benefit he appreciates
more now, as the Director of the Office of State Planning,
than he did while in Berlin.
Larry Goss pointed out that many things have changed
since 1981, especially in New Hampshire where the economy
has gone from mediocre to booming to terrible. The federal
government during the 1980s did a considerable amount of
drawing back from areas that had previously been heavily
involved in, such as water and sewer projects. Goss says
this has put "more pressure on CDBG since these other
programs disappeared." Still, he believes, the flexibility
and clarity of the program as administered by OSP are very
positive contributions to the health of communities. "I
like the program... it has straight-forward objectives... it
is a good program.
"
Linda Mangones, although somewhat negatively effected
by the scoring under OSP, believes that most of the changes
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have been beneficial. Although there have been many smaller
side issues to work out over the years, she contends that
"the purpose of the change was to disburse the money and get
it to smaller towns... it certainly accomplished that."
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A. Summary
The foregoing information, when taken in its entirety,
provides a clear picture of a program which underwent
tremendous changes. These changes resulted in significantly
different outcomes. Before determining what lessons can be
learned from this change in the program, it would seem to be
an appropriate juncture at which to summarize the major
points contained in the data analysis and interviews.
Data Analysis
The main points of interest found in the data analysis
can be summarized as follows:
All applications:
OSP funds a greater number of applicants than HUD had.
OSP funds a greater percentage of applications than HUD had.
OSP provides great recipients with a smaller dollar amount
per grant.
Population
:
Average size of municipalities has decreased significantly
under OSP
Geographic
OSP has attained a greater statewide distribution of funds.
Activities
:
OSP has distributed a greater proportion of the available
funds to economic development and public facilities
projects
.
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Housing rehabilitation remains the major activity area to
receive funds.
Interviews
Those interviewed made it clear that these observed
outcomes were intended. The communities recognized the
nature of the changes being made and responded accordingly.
The major causes of the changes, according to those who were
interviewed, were:
1. A difference between OSP
' s and HUD
' s philosophy which
resulted in:
A. A decision to fund more communities.
B. A decision to change the type of activities funded.
2. A decision on the part of the New Hampshire legislature
to increase the ability of OSP to respond to changing
needs and circumstances. This increased flexibility was
found both in rule-making and local implementation.
3. The state's increased emphasis on the low- and moderate-
income benefit which was a very significant change.
Requiring 51 percent of the funds to "directly benefit"
this group forced both OSP and the communities to design
their programs with this requirement always a major
consideration
.
My stated thesis was that by providing for a wider
disbursement of funds, by fostering a more efficient
administration of the program, and by encouraging a more
careful selection of projects for funding, moving program
administration to the state would allow CDBG funds in New
136
Hampshire to be used to meet more effectively the needs of
New Hampshire's low- and moderate-income households. Both
the results of the data collection and the interviews
suggest that my thesis was correct.
B. Lessons
What can be learned from this analysis? How can
information be used by other states or communities to
improve the use of their funds? What are the implications at
the national level? There are three main points that this
study has brought out.
The States Can Do It
First, I believe that the results of this study prove
that the states can, in some cases, run programs to serve
communities better than the national government. By all
accounts and every measure, the New Hampshire CDBG program
is running as well, and meeting the national objectives
better, than under HUD.
Although this may not be applicable in all cases, it
certainly suggests that the old notion that states are too
politically biased or administratively immature to run
complicated programs should be dismissed. Although this may
have once been true, it certainly is not any longer.
Capacity Building
Also, this points out the need for capacity building at
the state and local levels of government. This program was
effective because of the abilities of the individuals who
were tasked with these responsibilities.
137
At the state level, program design and initial start-up
management was essentially done by one dedicated and capable
individual, Larry Goss. Although there was fine-tuning by
the legislature and the Community Development Advisory
Committee, it was Goss who worked directly with HUD and
other state program directors, attended numerous workshops,
and wrote the draft regulations. Clearly, this is a case of
putting the right person in the right job, with the
responsibility and authority to carry out the assignment.
At the local level, it is clear that those communities
that were most successful had access to able people to apply
for and administer the grants, where there was not a Linda
Mangones or a Bill Ray available, the towns turned to
regional planning agencies. Those agencies which had, or
developed, in-house grant capabilities were able to bring
literally millions of dollars into their regions. The state
took the initiative to encourage this capacity building and
its efforts were rewarded.
Program Design
Lastly, the program design used by New Hampshire had
three elements that, in hindsight, helped guarantee its
success. These three elements were flexibility, a straight-
forward scoring system, and clear objectives. These elements
can be seen at every level and were repeatedly mentioned by
participants as major reasons for the success of the
program.
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C. Conclusion
The fact that the states are able to properly
administer large scale programs, the need for more
investment in human resources and the importance of program
design are three lessons which have wide applicability in
the public sector. Of course, none of these are new
concepts. What this study on the devolution of the CDBG
program from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to the New Hampshire Office of State Planning
demonstrated was that when properly implemented, the basic
theories of public administration work.
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APPENDIX
RAW DATA SHEETS
The headings on the raw data sheets (all those except
the
-Chart of General Information") are as follows:
Record #: This column is a computer-generated number which
is assigned as the data base is compiled. it has no rele-
vance to the study.
Agency: This column allows for easy identification of
whether the grant request or award was done by HUD or OSP.
FY: This column consists of the fiscal year of the grant
application
.
TOWN: This column contains the name of the municipality
which applied, and includes both cities and towns.
POP: This column contains the population of the municipali-
ty.
FUNDSREQ: This column contains the dollar amount of funds
each community requested on formal applications for block
grant funding.
FUNDSREC: This column contains the amount of funding re-
ceived by each community.
ACT: This column contains an abbreviation representing the
major type of activity the application contained. The
activities fall into the following categories:
HR - Housing Rehabilitation
ED - Economic Development
PF - Public Facilities
NA - Not Available. In most cases HUD did not keep
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records of activities planned by those appiicant
communities which they chose not to fund.
CI, C2, C3
- Comprehensive (Multi-purpose) grants which
were normally spread out, by HUD, over a three year
period. The number represents which year (1, 2, 3)
of the grant is being discussed.
COUNTY: This column indicates which of the !0 NH counties
the community is located in.
TABLE 14
RAW DATA
n contains a list of each record in the data
base sorted by fiscal year
.
A "0" in the funds reguested
category means that no record of the amount reguested could
be found, most usually becau se it was the second or third
year of a multi-year comprehensive grant.
AGNCY FY TOWN POP FNDREQ FNDSRC ACT CNTY
HUD 75 BROOKFIELD 400 8000 0 NA CARHUD 75 BRIDGWATER 600 103900 0 NA GRAHUD 75 DEERING 1000 42000 0 NA HILHUD 75 SALISBURY 1000 290000 0 NA MERHUD 75 WOODSTOCK 1000 300000 282000 PF GRA
HUD 75 MONTVERNON 1500 110000 0 NA HIL
HUD 75 TAMWORTH 1700 95000 0 NA CAR
HUD 75 ASHLAND 1800 85000 0 NA GRA
HUD 75 WARNER 2000 175000 175000 PF MER
HUD 75 ROLLNGSFRD 2400 70000 0 NA STR
HUD 75 ALTON 2400 95000 0 NA BEL
HUD 75 NRTHUMBRLD 2500 100000 0 NA COO
HUD 75 WILTON 2700 150000 0 NA HIL
HUD 75 WEARE 3300 85000 0 NA HIL
HUD 75 BOSCAWEN 3400 195000 0 NA MER
HUD 75 HAVERHILL 3400 109600 0 NA GRA
HUD 75 LANCASTER 3400 198500 0 NA COO
continued next page
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Table 14 continued
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
HUD
75 EPPING
75 HOPKINTON
75 LITCHFIELD
75 MEREDITH
7 5 NEWMARKET
7 5 FARMINGTON
75 GILFORD
7 5 PETERBORO
75 PLYMOUTH
7 5 RAYMOND
75 NEWPORT
7 5 FRANKLIN
75 PELHAM
75 MILFORD
75 BEFORD
7 5 SOMERSWRTH
75 DURHAM
75 EXETER
7 5 LEBANON
7 5 GOFFSTOWN
75 BERLIN
75 MERRIMACK
7 5 LACONIA
75 DERRY
75 KEENE
75 SALEM
7 5 CONCORD
3500
3900
4200
4200
4300
4600
4800
4900
5100
5500
6300
7900
8100
8700
9500
10400
10600
11000
11200
11300
13000
15500
15600
18900
21500
24200
30400
50000
500
220000
220000
894000
70000
269000
267000
80000
10000
316667
162800
7000
47000
30000
191000
70000
92000
55000
60000
30000
47000
400000
25000
367000
37000
350000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
137000
0
7000
9200
0
191000
0
40000
0
55000
20000
24800
0
0
50000
37000
0
HUD 76 WOODSTOCK 1000 456000 0HUD 76 NRTHUMBRLD 2500 100000 0HUD 76 HENNIKER 3200 300000 0HUD 76 GORHAM 3300 135000 0HUD 76 LANCASTER 3400 465000 0HUD 76 EPPING 3500 50000 0
HUD 76 CHARLESTWN 4500 60000 0HUD 76 COLEBROOK 4500 260476 0HUD 76 GILFORD 4800 50250 0
HUD 76 PLYMOUTH 5100 150000 0
HUD 76 NEWPORT 6300 100000 225000
HUD 76 HOOKSETT 7300 165000 0
HUD 76 PELHAM 8100 32000 10000
HUD 76 SOMERSWRTH 10400 560586 140000
HUD 76 EXETER 11000 575000 246000
HUD 76 LEBANON 11200 103000 0
HUD 76 BERLIN 13000 160000 130000
HUD 76 CLAREMONT 14500 198735 0
HUD 76 MERRIMACK 15500 47570 53000
HUD 76 DERRY 18900 275000 86000
HUD 76 KEENE 21500 429400 350000
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
HR
NA
PF
PF
NA
HR
NA
HR
NA
HR
HR
PF
NA
NA
HR
PF
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
HR
NA
PF
PF
HR
NA
PF
NA
PF
HR
HR
ROC
MER
HIL
BEL
ROC
STR
BEL
HIL
GRA
ROC
SUL
MER
HIL
HIL
HIL
STR
STR
ROC
GRA
HIL
COO
HIL
BEL
ROC
CHE
ROC
MER
GRA
COO
MER
COO
coo
ROC
SUL
COO
BEL
GRA
SUL
MER
HIL
STR
ROC
GRA
COO
SUL
HIL
ROC
CHE
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Table 14 continued
HUD 7 6 CAT RM 24200
HUD 7 fi UUJN LUKU 30400
HUD 7 7 WUUUb I ULK 1000
HUD 7 7/ / JNK1HUMBRLD 2500
hud11 U LJ 7 7 UULiUBRUOK 4500
htid 7 7 IN CjWPUKT 6300
HTTD1 1 LJ J_J 7 7/ / T)T?T TJ n Tv/r 8100
Hun11U LJ 7 7 bUMtKbWRT
H
10400
HUD 7 7 T?V T? T I? O 11000
HnnLl\J LJ 7 7/ / J-iCitsAINUlN 11200
HTTD11 U LJ 7 7/ / bUr r b lUWlN 11300
HUD 7 7/ / P. TT 13 T TM i o r\ r\ r\13000
HUD1 1 LJ LJ 7 7 14500
HUD 77 MERRIMACK 15500
HUD 77 LACONIA 15600
HUD 77 LJ ]_j IV IV I 1 0 ? U u
HUD 77 KFFNRiV I_j I_j IN Ej Z13UU
HUD 77 O *A I_l J_j 1\L o z o n nz ft z u u
HUD 77 concord\-/ j.i . v_y i\.
HUD 78 NFWDTTRHAMIN l_j V I !_/ LJ 1\ 1 1xTX i i ? n nx z u u
HUD 78 ASHLANDxi Ull J IxxlN J_/ i son
HUD 78 DEERFTELDi—' J—J l_l iVl _L 1 1 1 1 J 2 n n n\j \j \j
HUD 78 MILTON111JJ J. L_/1N 7^00z. j u u
HUD 78 NRTHTTMRRT.nIi X\ 1 11 U 11 LJ IV J_l LJ
HUD 78 OSS Tppp\J o o irljlj 9 e. n n
HUD 78/ LJ n 1 1 or xriij_iu
HUD 7 8 HAVFPRHTT T a n n
HUD 7 8 T.ANTP A QTFR ^ a r> n
HUD11 LJ 7 ft WOT FFRDRD a n n nft u u u
HUD1 1 LJ 78 ivijzj r\ r_ju _i_ j. n a 7 n n
HUD1 1 LJ 7 R
HUD 7 8 nuurvoij x j_ 7 ^ n n
Him1 1 LJ LJ 7 R Pr^T HAM O 1 u u
HTTD1 1 LJ 7 8 3 JUU
HUD 78/ LJ SOMFR SWRTHo v_/i ii_j i\.o vv r\. x n 1 0400x u t* u u
HUD 7 8/ LJ DURHAMLJ LJ In. 1 1 z^J. 1 x u u u u
HUD 78 EXETFRHi *\ J_i X ill £\ 1 1 ODDX X u u u
HUD 78 LEBANON 112006 v V
HUD 78 BERLIN 13000
HUD 78 CLAREMONT 14500
HUD 78 MERRIMACK 15500
HUD 78 LACONT
A
un^vii in 15600X ^J \J \J \J
HUD 78 KEENE 21500
HUD 78 CONCORD 30400
HUD 79 STRATFORD 1000
HUD 79 NRTHUMBRLD 2500
64750 59000 PF ROC
150000 0 NA MER
170000 0 NA GRA
135000 0 NA COO
380000 0 NA COO
541000 0 NA SUL
32500 13000 HR HIL
255000 255000 HR STR
590000 0 NA ROC
445000 190000 HR GRA
90000 109000 HR HIL
325000 312500 HR COO
250000 250000 HR SUL
70100 D O U U U T) TPrr T T T THIL
999999 0 NA BEL
100000 0 NA ROC
413000 119500 HR CHE
100500 73000 HR ROC
62000 62000 HR MER
72215 0 NA STR
146750 0 NA GRA
36960 0 NA ROC
150500 0 NA STR
178500 0 NA COO
999999 0 CO CAR
683737 0 CO MER
40000 0 NA GRA
175000 174250 HR COO
999999 0 CO CAR
999999 0 CO BEL
295000 0 NA ROC
257000 0 NA MER
140000 78000 HR HIL
256000 0 NA HIL
350000 350000 CI STR
500000 0 NA STR
505000 0 CO ROC
999999 0 CO GRA
300000 300000 CI COO
400000 400000 CI SUL
428000 350000 PF HIL
500000 500000 CI BEL
300000 300000 HR CHE
349000 349000 CI MER
230350 0 NA COO
178500 178500 PF coo
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Table 14 continued
HUD 79 OSSIPEE 2500
MUD 79 PITTSFIELD 2900
TJTTT\MUD 79 RAYMOND 5500TTTTnHUD 79 FRANKLIN 7900TJTTnnUD 79 BEDFORD 9500
T_TTTT\HUD 79 SOMERSWRTH 10400
TT T T T~"\HUD 79 EXETER 11000
T TT TnHUD 79 LEBANON 11200
HUD 79 BERLIN 13000
HUD 79 CLAREMONT 14500
HUD 79 MERRIMACK 1 s s n n
HUD 79 LACONIA 15600
HUD 79 DERRY 18900
HUD 79 KEENE 21500
TT T TT*\HUD 79 SALEM 24200
HUD 79 CONCORD 30400
TT T T T~\HUD 80 WOODSTOCK 1000
HUD 80 OSSIPEE 2500
TT T T T\HUD 80 NEWMARKET 4300
HUD 80 RAYMOND 5500
UTTnMUL) 8 0 LITTLETON 5600
nUD o n8 0 SOMERSWRTH 10400
T-ITTr\n U u 8 U EXETER 11000
o U LEBANON 11200
nUD 8 0 GOFFSTOWN 11300
HUD 80 BERLIN 13000
HUD 80 CLAREMONT 14500
T_TT TT\HUD 80 LACONIA 15600
TTTTAHUD 80 DERRY 18900
TJTTr\HUD 80 KEENE 21500
T T T T T*vHUD 80 CONCORD 30400
HUD 8
1
STRATFORD 1000
T T TTT>HUD 8 WHITEFIELD 1700
HUD 81 OSSIPEE 2500
HUD 81 WILTON 2700
T_T T T T\HUD 8 1 PITTSFIELD 2900
T T T T T~"\HUD 8 LANCASTER 3400
T T T T T*\HUD 8 NEWMARKET 4300
T_TT TT~\HUD O 18 1 LITTLETON 5600
rlUL) O 18 TT* T"> 7\ \TT7T TXTFRANKLIN 7900
HUD 8 1 7\ > K T T T71 f"l mAMHERST 8300
HUD 81 MILFORD 8700
HUD 81 SOMERSWRTH 10400
HUD 81 EXETER 11000
HUD 81 LEBANON 11200
HUD 81 GOFFSTOWN 11300
HUD 81 BERLIN 13000
391373 5Q1 oj y x j / j T~i TP CAR
320663 32066^ UDtlK T\/T T7I T>MER
395800 nu NA ROC
252300 nu NA MER
206000 nu XT 7\NA HIL
500000 juuuuu L2 STR
382000 u NA ROC
185900 u NA GRA
0 C2 COO
400000 400000 C2 SUL
548600 0 NA HIL
400000 C2 BEL
595000 R A R n n nJIOUUU TTnHR ROC
281500 T_T T~>HR CHE
534000 l ooonni v u u u u UK r-\ r-\ r-\ROC
351000 J JXUUU MER
400000 o INA LrKA
399858 400000* \j \j \j \j yj XT r /"» 7\ t-)LAK
400000 400000 T?nr"KUL
357303 0 NA RHP
400000 400000 HRI 1 1A. PD AuIUl
350000 350000 C3 C^Rola
364000 364000 HR DAP
400000 400000 CI GRA
300000 304000 PF HIL
0 300000 C3 COO
400000 400000 C3 9TTT
300000 300000 C3 RFT.DIjJj
400000 400000 HR RHP
999999 o ro PHF
500000 500000J V V V U V
182000 o MA rnn
376000 275000 PF
500000 500000•J \J \J \J \J \J PF par
120100 120000 HR HTT,i 1 -L i_J
300000 300000 CI MFR1 I ill 1\
307000 o NA COO
599500 600000 CI ROC
395000 0 NA GRA
380545 0 NA MER
400000 0 NA HIL
95500 0 NA HIL
505000 505000 CI STR
600000 0 CO ROC
400000 400000 C2 GRA
400000 534000 HR HIL
600000 600000 CI COO
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Table 14 continued
HUD 81 C T .A R PMnMT1 1 / C A A14500
HUD 81 CLAREMONT 1 A r n nItJUU
HUD 81 MERRIMACK 15500
HUD 81 LACONIA 15600
HUD 81 DERRY 18900
HUD 81 KEENE 21500
HUD 81 CONCORD 30400
HUD 82 LISBON
HUD 82 PITTSFIELD
HUD 82 WINCHESTER
HUD 82 FRANKLIN
HUD 82 SOMERSWRTH
HUD 82 LEBANON
HUD 82 BERLIN
HUD 82 CLAREMONT
HUD 82 LACONIA
HUD 82 DERRY
HUD 82 KEENE
HUD 82 CONCORD
OSP 8 3 WOODSTOCK
OSP 8 3 NRTHUMBRLD
OSP 83 PITTSFIELD
OSP 83 WINCHESTER
OSP 83 EPPING
OSP 83 HINSDALE
OSP 8 3 FARMINGTON
OSP 83 PEMBROKE
OSP 83 NEWPORT
OSP 83 CONWAY
OSP 83 FRANKLIN
OSP 8 3 SOMERSWRTH
OSP 83 BERLIN
OSP 83 CLAREMONT
OSP 83 CLAREMONT
OSP 83 LACONIA
OSP 83 CONCORD
OSP 84 CROYDON
OSP 84 WHITEFIELD
OSP 84 TROY
OSP 84 MARLBORO
OSP 84 ALTON
OSP 84 OSSIPEE
OSP 84 CANAAN
OSP 84 WILTON
OSP 84 AUBURN
OSP 84 HAVERHILL
369500
999999
411000
500000
163000
999999
450000
351500
0
0
500000
163000
0
450000
PF
CO
NA
CI
ED
CO
CI
SUL
SUL
HIL
BEL
ROC
CHE
MER
1500 304000 304000 ED GRA
2900 455000 455000 CI MER
3500 365000 365000 HR CHE
7900 500000 500000 HR MER
10400 600000 600000 CI STR
11200 400000 400000 CI GRA
13000 0 500000 C2 COO
14500 500000 500000 ED SUL
1 c a n a 600000 600000 CI BEL
1 onnni o y u u O 1 c n a a335000 335000 HR ROC
Z ± D U U /I £ s\ r\ s\ r\460000 460000 HR CHE
~k n a n nJU4UU c n n n r\ r\OUUOOO 600000 CI MER
i nnnX u u u nU A c\ f\ r\ r\ f\400000 PF GRA
^ JUU nu A A A A A A400000 HR COO
9900
-7 \J \J u T r i r\ f\ t\oolUOO C2 MER
3500 0 325904 HR CHE
3500 0 400000 HR ROC
^700J / uu u A A A AAA4UU(J(J0 HR CHE
a n n U O C C A A A355000 HR STR
a q n n U A A A A A A400000 HR MER
connD j U U Au T A A A A A380000 HR SUL
/ z u u 0 265000 ED CAR
/you 0 345000 HR MER
1 U 4 U U 0 395000 C2 STR
i o n rt r\1 oUUU 0 400000 C3 COO
14500 0 355000 ED SUL
14500 0 45000 HR SUL
15600 0 400000 C2 BEL
30400 0 450000 C2 MER
460 155000 0 ED SUL
1700 0 130361 ED COO
1800 350000 0 HR CHE
1850 247300 0 ED CHE
2400 38900 0 PF BEL
2500 0 297500 HR CAR
2500 0 200000 PF GRA
2700 0 350000 PF HIL
2900 287500 0 HR ROC
3400 0 239500 PF GRA
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Table 14 continued
a c nUbP 84 HILLSBORO 3500a c nUbP 84 WINCHESTER 3500a o n 84 EPPING 3500AnnUbP 84 HINSDALE 3700OCT)UbP 84 WOLFBORO 4000
UbP 84 CHARLESTWN 4500
nor)UbP O A84 FARMINGTON 4600
UbP O A84 PEMBROKE 4900AnnUbP 84 PLYMOUTH 5100
UbP a a84 SWANZEY 5200A O nUbP 84 RAYMOND 5500
OSP 84 LITTLETON 5600
UbP 84 NEWPORT 6300
USP 84 CONWAY 7200
USP 84 FRANKLIN 7900
USP 84 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 84 LEBANON 11200
OSP 84 BERLIN 13000
OSP 84 BERLIN 13000
OSP 84 LONDONDRRY 13600
OSP 84 HUDSON 14000
OSP 84 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 84 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 84 LACONIA 15600
OSP 84 DERRY 18900
OSP 84 KEENE 21500
A C" nUbP O A84 TT T—1 -I—I » T 1 1KEENE 21500AnnUbP O A84 CONCORD 30400
UbP q ao D T 7\ X T T""\ 7\ FIT"
l
LANDAFF 300
UbP o cO 5 "1 \ 7\ x (T1AX7DALTON 700AnnObP 85 LEMPSTER 700
ObP 85 BETHLEHEM 1800
OSP 85 TROY 2100
OSP 85 WAKEFIELD 2250
Apr*OSP 85 SUNAPEE 2300
OSP 85 PITTSFIELD 2900
OSP 85 WOLFEBORO 4000
OSP 85 MEREDITH 4200
OSP 85 NEWMARKET 4300
OSP 85 COLEBROOK 4500
OSP 85 PLYMOUTH 5100
OSP 85 RAYMOND 5500
OSP 85 NEWPORT 6300
OSP 85 CONWAY 7200
OSP 85 FRANKLIN 7900
OSP 85 LISBON 8700
OSP 85 MILFORD 8700
OSP 85 SOMERSWRTH 10400
350000 0 HR
0 336000 HR PHP1
0 240000 HR
0 325000 HR PHFV-» 1 1 lit
221000 0 PF CAR
0 227950 PF SUL
0 190000 HR STR
0 67683 HR MER
220000 0 PF GRA
300000 0 HR CHE
192000 166456 PF ROC
0 71000 HR GRA
0 113500 FD OTTTo U J_i
0 294500 RHi\L 1 PAR
0 350000 HR MPR
0 500000 HR O J. 1\
0 154350 HR pr a
0 215000 ED PDDww
0 285000 ED POD
400000 0 ED ROC
49500 0 PF HIL
323000 323000 ED SUL
i n n n r\ a1 / / U U U 177000 ED SUL
314800 291800 PF BEL
500000 0 PF ROC
180000 63400 HR CHE
160000 160000 PF CHE
0 500000 HR MER
0 350000 HR GRA
0 350000 HR COO
0 287500 HR SUL
0 230000 ED GRA
0 217000 HR CHE
350000 0 NA CAR
0 131500 HR SUL
346000 0 NA MER
0 300000 PF CAR
350000 0 NA BEL
0 284660 ED ROC
0 350000 HR COO
0 270000 ED GRA
0 276000 PF ROC
0 239000 HR SUL
0 16600 ED CAR
350000 0 NA MER
0 350000 HR GRA
0 350000 HR HIL
206400 162250 HR STR
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Table 14 continued
OSP 85 LEBANON 11200OSP 85 LEBANON 11200
OSP 85 GOFFSTOWN 11300OSP 85 BERLIN 13000
OSP 85 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 85 CLAREMONT 1 A r r> n
OSP 85 LACONIA 15600
USP 85 DERRY 18900
OSP 85 KEENE 21500
UbP 85 CANAAN 25001
OSP 85 CONCORD 30400
OSP 86 DALTON 700
USP 86 CARROLL 700
OSP 86 TAMWORTH 1700
OSP 86 BETHLEHEM 1800
OSP 86 ASHLAND 1800
OSP 86 WARNER 2000
OSP 86 GREENVILLE 2000
OSP 86 NORTHWOOD 2200
OSP 86 NRTHUMBRLD 2500
OSP 86 CANAAN 2500
OSP 86 HENNIKER 3200
OSP 86 WALPOLE 3200
OSP 86 WINCHESTER 3500
OSP 86 CHARLESTWN 4400
OSP 86 FARMINGTON 4600
OSP 86 HINSDALE 4700
UbP 8 6 PLYMOUTH 5100
ACT)UbP 8 6 LITTLETON 5600
APT)UbF 8 6 NEWPORT 6300
r\ c dUbF o 6 SOMERSWRTH 10400
APT)UbF O 0 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 86 LEBANON 11200
OSP 86 GOFFSTOWN 11300
OSP 86 BERLIN 13000
OSP 86 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 86 LACONIA 15600
OSP 86 KEENE 21500
OSP 87 DORCHESTER 300
OSP 87 DALTON 700
OSP 87 MIDDLETON 800
OSP 87 PITTSBURG 800
OSP 87 STWARTSTWN 1000
OSP 87 WOODSTOCK 1000
OSP 87 LISBON 1500
OSP 87 WHITEFIELD 1700
OSP 87 WARNER 2000
n 200000 ED GRA
1 o r n n n
-L \J -J U U U 0 NA GRA
2 2 on 0 NA HIL
0 1 O R 1 a n PF COO
281000 281000 ED SUL
70640 70640 PF SUL50000D—J \J \j \J \j \j DUUUUU ED BEL
293000 U NA ROC
500000 U NA CHE
350000 1 7 ft n n r>
-L / o u u u PF GRA
0 tOUUUU HR MER
312000 1 4/1 tnnIttDUU HR COO
332000 U ED coo
i9onnn i y U U U U PF CAR
3snnnn•J -J \J \J U U O A. A A A A^ U U U (J 0 HR GRA
3 3 4 1 nnJ J T 1 UU *3 O >1 1 A AJ J4 100 PF GRA
3 5finnn
-j ~j \j u u u "3 1 COCA PF MER3 n n n n n O r\ £ r\ f\ r\206000 HR HIL
1 C. A A A PF ROC
J ~J \J \J u u O C A A A A HR COO
1 7 2 n n nX / U U U 1 n o n A A1 / / U U U PF GRA
O A A A A Ao u u u u u ED MER
2 50000 Au PF CHE
295000 O T A O A A IT 13HR CHE
350000 n Fr SUL
200000\j \j \j \j \j o n n n n n un STR
350000 ? ? 3 i nn UK UHiL
320000 17 5 000 pnHi U PD 7\
286000 2 8 6000 Hi L) LfKA
286000 286000V-/ vy \y \J HR <5TTTOUJj
276000 200000fcrf v V \J \s \S PF17 J. O ± K
226000 217250 HR STR
109250 109250 PF GRA
493000 182000X \J £t \J \J \J r r UTTn. x xj
874900 R74Qnn DTP AAA
500000 hk CTTTb UJ_I
500000J U u v U U Rnnnnn pn DPTDEiXj
snoonnJUUUUU ? 7 r n n nZ / O U u u [IDHK r'TJcLHti
^nnnn•J -J u u u u i 7 fiinnX / D t U U WDtlK An 7v
i 4nnno i ? q n nX Z D U U DT?r r LUU
? q a n n n 1 y D u u u HK Cmnb I
K
350000 300000 HR COO
350000 350000 HR coo
350000 300000 HR GRA
350000 117600 HR GRA
286200 286200 PF COO
350000 155000 PF MER
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Table 14 continued
OSP 87 ANTRIM 2200
OSP 87 MILTON 2500
OSP 87 HENNIKER 3200
OSP 87 GORHAM 3300
OSP 87 HAVERHILL 3400
OSP 87 WINCHESTER 3500
OSP 87 EPPING 3500
OSP 87 CHARLESTWN 4500
OSP 87 FARMINGTON 4600
OSP 87 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 87 RFRT.TN 1 "3 ft n n
OSP 87 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 87 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 87 LACONIA 15600
OSP 87 KEENE 21500
OSP 87 CONCORD 30400
OSP 88 LYMAN 300
OSP 88 COLUMBIA 700
OSP 88 MIDDLETON 800
OSP 88 BATH 800
OSP 88 MADISON 1100
OSP 88 UNITY 1100
OSP 88 LINCOLN 1400
OSP 88 LISBON 1500
OSP 88 GREENVILLE 2000
OSP 88 WARNER 2000
OSP 88 NORTHWOOD 2200
OSP 88 BRISTOL 2200
OSP 88 OSSIPEE 2500
OSP 88 CANAAN 2500
OSP 88 NORTHFIELD 3100
OSP 88 HILLSBORO 3500
OSP 88 EPPING 3500
OSP 88 WINCHESTER 3500
OSP 88 HINSDALE 3700
OSP 88 COLEBROOK 4500
OSP 88 LITTLETON 5600
OSP 88 NEWPORT 6300
OSP 88 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 88 CLAREMONT 14500
OSP 88 LACONIA 15600
OSP 88 KEENE 21500
OSP 88 CONCORD 30400
J v v U U *2 C\ C\ C\ C\ f\ PF HIL
"3 s n n n n 1 O c\ c\ r\ c\130000 HR STR
i 3 1 JUU 0 ED MER
293onn
~J \J \J \J ED COO
35000D "2 ft f\ H ft ftjUUUUU HR GRA
350000 "X O ft ft ft T T TtHR CHE
350000 u T» TPPr ROC
350000 1 ft ~\ 0 O 0 DTP bUL
325000 2 9 ? sono 7 J v u "DTPire b 1 K
500000 0 HR STR
300000 188000 PF COO
400000 2 65800 HT? CTTT
150000 1 soooo EiL) SUL
500000 34ft000JtOUUU T? T\CjU
195000 1 Q c; ft ft ft1" JUUU rr CHE
500000J w u V v u O ft A ft ft ftZ o 4 U U U HR MER
350000•*J —J \J \J \J \J U TT TlHR GRA
3snnnn
•J -J \J VJ \J \J o c n ft ft ft HR COO
^ U J v \J u nu TJ T"\HR STR
L Ut J U Z O 4 D U PF GRA
350000J J U V U V "3 ft ft ft ft ftjUUUUU HR CAR
301 son u Fr SUL
250000 ftu HK GRA
350000%j *j \j \j \j \j ? ^ 9 A ft ft HK bKA
350000 ftu HK TJTTH 1 Li
350000 2 50000L J V u V U
350000 o PF RDP
350000 ft PFit r
350000 0 HR PAR
310000 0 PF CR AVJivfl
350000 350000 HR MER
350000 0 HR HIL
350000 0 PF ROC
350000 350000 PF CHE
116100 0 PF CHE
350000 350000 HR COO
350000
-J *J \J \J \j \j 350000J J U W U v PF CTTTo U i_i
350000 0 HR SUL
319792 319792 HR STR
350000 0 HR SUL
361000 361000 HR BEL
500000 500000 HR CHE
221000 221000 PF MER
OSP 89 LYMAN
OSP 89 WARREN
OSP 89 GRAFTON
OSP 89 BATH
continued next page
300
700
800
800
350000
350000
350000
350000
350000
350000
350000
215000
HR
HR
HR
HR
GRA
GRA
GRA
GRA
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Table 14 continued
OSP 89 STEWRTSTWN 1000
OSP 89 CAMPTON 1700
OSP 89 WHITEFIELD 1700
OSP 89 WARNER 2000
OSP 89 GREENVILLE 2000
OSP 89 BRISTOL 2200
OSP 89 OSSIPEE 2500
OSP 89 PITTSFIELD 2900
OSP 89 NEWTON 3100
OSP 89 GORHAM 3300
OSP 89 HAVERHILL 3400APT)UbP 89 TILTON 3400
UbP 89 RAYMOND 5500
OSP 89 LITTLETON 5600
OSP 89 NEWPORT 6300
OSP 89 CONWAY 7200
OSP 89 LACONIA 15600
OSP 89 KEENE 21500
OSP 89 CONCORD 30400
OSP 89 CONCORD 30400
OSP 90 GRAFTON 800
OSP 90 UNITY 1100
OSP 90 WHITEFIELD 1700
OSP 90 WARNER 2000
OSP 90 CANAAN 2500
OSP 90 HAVERHILL 3400
OSP 90 TILTON 3400
OSP 90 COLEBROOK 4500
OSP 90 NEWPORT 6300
OSP 90 SOMERSWRTH 10400
OSP 90 CLARKSVILL 300
OSP 90 STARK 500
OSP 90 WENTWORTH 600
OSP 90 COLUMBIA 700
OSP 90 CONCORD 30400
335000 j jjUUU HR COO
322000 u PF GRA
250000 i JUUUU T> TPPr COO
350000 jjuuuu ir r MER
350000 j juuuu nK TT T TH IL
350000 n fc GRA
350000 350000J J U W U V r r p j\ nLAK
350000 350000 PF MFD
350000 o PF
247500 o HR1 1 rv. nnn
350000 350000 HR no a
350000 350000 HR RFT,O l_j J_l
212900 212900 PF rop1vvvw
150000 150000 PF GRA
300000 300000 HR SUL
350000 0 PF CAR
396450 396450 HR RFT
200000 200000 PF PHF
375000 345000 HR MFR
125000 125000 PFIT MFR
300000 o XI Iv
24000 24000 ST ±7 QTTT
350000 350000 PF rnn
168200 168200-i- \J \J £j \J \J PF MFR
350000 350000 HR
350000 350000 PF CR A
500000 500000 HR BEL
225000 225000 HR COO
350000 350000 HR SUL
825000 825000 PF STR
296000 296000 HR COO
350000 350000 HR SUL
350000 350000 HR GRA
350000 350000 HR SUL
122000 122000 PF MER
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